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SOMEONE TO LIEN ON: PRIVATIZATION 
OF DELINQUENT PROPERTY TAX  
LIENS AND TAX SALE SURPLUS  
IN MASSACHUSETTS 
Abstract: In Massachusetts, as well as in twenty-eight other states in the nation, 
municipalities can sell delinquent property tax liens to private investors. In ex-
change for paying for the debt, the private entity can collect interest rates of up to 
sixteen percent and levy additional fees on the homeowner. If the homeowner is 
unable to pay the rapidly growing amount they owe, absolute title of the property, 
which includes any profits from the subsequent sale, passes to the private enti-
ty—providing them with the property for pennies on the dollar. This practice was 
introduced as a tool to enable municipalities to collect due property tax, but has 
had particularly devastating effects on vulnerable members of society and tends 
to cause economic distress in ways that have been largely ignored. This Note ar-
gues that such practices are unjust, inequitable, and likely unconstitutional. Leg-
islative and pre-litigation solutions should be enacted to protect these members of 
society from predatory tactics. 
INTRODUCTION 
Bennie Coleman, a retired Marine sergeant suffering from dementia, lost 
his $197,000 home that he had lived in for seventy-six years after failing to 
pay a $134 property tax bill.1 When Coleman’s son learned that his father had 
missed some payments, he attempted to settle the delinquency.2 Unfortunately, 
he discovered that the city’s tax collector had sold the tax lien on the property 
to a private investor that had already initiated foreclosure proceedings.3 In or-
der for Coleman to save his home, the investment company demanded $4,999 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Coleman ex rel. Bunn v. District of Columbia, 70 F. Supp. 3d 58, 64 (D.D.C. 2014); Michael 
Sallah et al., Left with Nothing, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/
investigative/2013/09/08/left-with-nothing [https://perma.cc/QWK4-95LC]. Coleman originally 
missed a property tax bill of $133.88 in 2006 and the city added an additional $183.47 in penalties. 
Coleman, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 64. The District of Columbia auctioned Coleman’s tax lien of $317.35 in 
July 2007 to private investors. Id. Coleman’s tax lien was purchased by Embassy Tax Services, LLC. 
Id.  
 2 Coleman, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 64. In September 2008, Coleman’s son wrote to the court stating 
that he had found out that his father was living by himself and was not properly taking his medication. 
Id. He asked the court to give him about a week to submit most of the delinquent payments. Id. The 
court imposed a new deadline of May 2009 to complete the payments. Id. at 65. 
 3 Id. at 64. In September 2008, Coleman’s son sent a letter to the court stating that he had just 
discovered his father’s tax delinquency, but Embassy Tax Services filed the action to foreclose in 
February 2008. Id. 
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in fees and expenses in addition to the original missed property tax.4 Coleman 
and his son were unable to pay, so the court approved the foreclosure of Cole-
man’s right of redemption in 2010.5 In the summer of 2011, federal marshals 
escorted Bennie Coleman out of his home, and he watched them empty all of his 
belongings onto the curb.6 In addition to losing his lifelong home, Coleman 
lost all equity in the property because tax lien purchasers take property title 
free of the former owner’s equity interest.7 
Coleman’s story is too common—Vicki Valentine lost her Baltimore 
home due to her failure to pay a $362 water bill.8 Paul and Michele Meaney 
lost their $270,000 Worcester, Massachusetts home for failing to pay a $224.58 
utility bill while suffering numerous health crises and were financially crippled 
by the remaining mortgage.9 An elderly Rhode Island woman was evicted from 
                                                                                                                           
 4 Id. Embassy Tax Services demanded $4,999 in addition to the $317.35 of the original lien, for 
“court costs, attorney’s fees, expenses incurred for service of process by publication, and fees of title 
search.” Id. 
 5 See id. at 65 (stating that Coleman’s son paid off all owed taxes before the court’s deadline, but 
had not paid the amount owed to Embassy Tax Services); Statutory Right of Redemption, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A debtor’s statutory right to reclaim property seized by a creditor 
either by paying to the creditor the entire debt plus any expenses incurred by the creditor or by reim-
bursing the buyer of the property for the purchase price. Also termed right to redeem.”). Coleman’s 
son had proposed that his father pay $850 a month towards the amount owed to Embassy, which the 
court accepted. Coleman, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 65. The court set a status hearing in June 2009, but neither 
Mr. Coleman nor his son appeared, and the court could not contact his son. Id. The court then issued a 
judgment extinguishing Coleman’s rights in the property and executed a deed to Embassy Tax Ser-
vices free and clear of any prior encumbrances. Id. At that point, the home was worth approximately 
$200,000. Id.  
 6 Sallah et al., supra note 1. Coleman slept on the front porch of his former home in a folding 
chair that night. Id. He lived on the front porch for months, frequently stopping neighbors or passing 
police officers for assistance, believing that he had accidentally locked himself out. Spencer S. Hsu, 
D.C. to Pay $1 Million to Settle Families’ Claims for Homes Taken by Tax-Lien Program, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/dc-to-pay-1-million-to-
settle-families-claims-for-homes-taken-by-tax-lien-program/2017/01/10/6937c2b0-d68c-11e6-9f9f-
5cdb4b7f8dd7_story.html [https://perma.cc/L4PS-FEBD]. 
 7 Sallah et al., supra note 1. 
 8 Fred Schulte et al., The Other Foreclosure Menace, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/18/the-other-foreclosure-men_n_579936.html [https://perma.cc/
K48L-WMKD]. By the time Ms. Valentine became aware that she owed delinquent property taxes, 
the amount had increased tenfold to $3,600. Id. She was unable to pay this amount and was ultimately 
evicted. Id. Her father had paid off the mortgage in 1984, but now an investment company owns her 
home. Id. 
 9 Tallage LLC v. Meaney, 23 LCR 375, 375–76 (Mass. Land Ct. 2015). The family was experi-
encing numerous health crises that derailed their lives. Id. at 379. Mrs. Meaney spent significant time 
in the hospital due to Multiple Sclerosis and celiac disease, which caused her to experience severe 
tingling, extreme fatigue, blurred vision, blinding headaches, and gastrointestinal issues that left her 
housebound. Id. Their two young children were diagnosed with a learning disability and a vision prob-
lem, and were seeing therapists from the trauma of dealing with a very sick mother. Id. In the past, the 
family’s mortgage company monitored unpaid taxes and paid the amounts out of the escrow accounts. 
Id. at 378. Mr. Meaney assumed that this meant the mortgage company would always do this. Id. at 
379. Additionally, the family received notices of the missing bills during their move to a new home, 
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her home of forty years for missing a sewer bill of $474, and her home was 
bought at a tax sale for $836.39.10 These are just a few examples of what oc-
curs every year.11 
Every state has a law that enables municipal governments to sell real 
property through tax lien foreclosure when the homeowner does not pay prop-
erty taxes, and some states also include delinquent utility bills.12 Typically, a 
lien automatically forms on the property by operation of state statute after the 
taxes remain delinquent for a certain period of time.13 Local governments can 
enforce the liens themselves, but twenty-eight states currently have laws that 
allow municipalities to sell tax liens to private purchasers.14 The lienholder, 
whether it be the town or a private purchaser, collects interest, costs, and fees 
from the taxpayer and may ultimately acquire the property through the tax 
foreclosure process.15 
Massachusetts is among the states in which municipalities can choose to 
sell tax liens to private buyers.16 Additionally, the Commonwealth’s tax fore-
closure approach has no requirement that the foreclosing party provide the sur-
plus from the subsequent sale of the property to the original homeowner.17 
Once the Massachusetts Land Court enters a judgment of foreclosure of the 
                                                                                                                           
and the court believed that the notices had been placed in boxes and accidentally overlooked. Id. at 
378. Mr. Meaney’s stress was acute, evidenced by letting rent checks go uncashed for months and the 
loss of several clients due to distraction from his work. Id. at 379. 
 10 JOHN RAO, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., THE OTHER FORECLOSURE CRISIS: PROPERTY TAX 
LIEN SALES 9 (2012). The woman was eighty-one years old and was evicted from her home two 
weeks prior to Christmas. Id. The corporation that bought her home resold the property at auction for 
$85,000. Id. 
 11 See generally id. (providing a variety of examples of low-income, elderly, and sick people who 
lost their homes due to this policy and showing investors taking a windfall). 
 12 Id. at 8; see Tallage, 23 LCR at 375 (detailing how a family lost their home to tax foreclosure 
because of failure to pay a water and sewer bill, which falls under Massachusetts’ definition of “taxes” 
and automatically generated a municipal lien that the city sold to an investor). A “municipal lien” is 
defined as: “A lien by a municipal corporation against a property owned for the owner’s proportionate 
share of a public improvement that specially and individually benefits the owner.” Lien, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5. A “lien” is defined as: “A legal right or interest that a creditor has in 
another person’s property, lasting until a debt or duty that it secures is satisfied.” Id. Each state’s tax 
lien statute is unique, and the procedure varies from state to state. RAO, supra note 10, at 11. 
 13 See RAO, supra note 10, at 12 (stating that it is common for the statute to create liens on the 
property automatically when a certain period of time has lapsed after the tax obligation became delin-
quent). For example, the relevant Missouri statute reads, “[a]ll real estate upon which the taxes remain 
unpaid on the first day of January, annually, are delinquent, and the county collector shall enforce the 
lien of the state thereon . . . .” MO. ANN. STAT. § 140.010 (West 2019). 
 14 RAO, supra note 10, at 43–46. 
 15 Id. at 17. Interest rates on the unpaid tax can be a very high rate, often between 18–50%. Id. at 
4. When a lienholder acquires the property through a judgment of foreclosure, they obtain title free 
and clear of any other existing lien. Id. at 17. 
 16 Id. at 44. 
 17 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 60, § 64 (West 2019) (stating that title after foreclosure is 
absolute); Kelly v. City of Boston, 204 N.E.2d 123, 125 (Mass. 1965) (holding that the statute intends 
for the surplus from a tax sale to belong to the municipality). 
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homeowner’s right of redemption, the foreclosing party takes absolute title, 
free and clear of prior interests.18 Enormously inequitable outcomes occur as a 
result because property owners can lose all equity in their home for missing a 
single tax or utility payment.19 By allowing private entities to drive up costs 
and charge high interest rates, the privatization of delinquent property tax liens 
effectively enables investors to hold financially distressed taxpayers’ homes 
hostage to create a windfall.20 
Property tax revenues are the primary source of income for local govern-
ments, so nonpayment or late payment of property taxes can present problems 
to local governments with an already tight budget.21 Local governments use 
tax revenues to finance numerous public services such as schools, police pro-
grams, and fire protection.22 Facing budgeting shortfalls increases uncertainty 
                                                                                                                           
 18 Ch. 60, § 64; see Ralph D. Clifford, Massachusetts Has a Problem: The Unconstitutionality of 
Tax Deed, 13 U. MASS. L. REV. 274, 280–81 (2019) (noting that the tax foreclosure results in an abso-
lute title, meaning that the former owner loses any claim to the property). “Absolute” is defined as 
“[f]ree from restriction, qualification, or condition.” Absolute, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra 
note 5. Before the judgment of foreclosure is entered, the title to the land is held by the lienholder 
subject to the homeowner’s right of redemption, which means that the homeowner has the right to 
regain title to their property if they meet the statutory requirements, such as paying off the taxes owed 
plus interest, fees and expenses. Clifford, supra, at 280; see ch. 60, § 62 (stating that a person with an 
interest in land taken because of nonpayment of taxes is able to redeem before the filing of petition for 
foreclosure, and that a person may do so by paying the amount of tax owed, 16% interest, and all 
additional lawful charges in the tax title account).  
 19 See Clive McFarlane, Real People Lose in Tax Lien Sales, TELEGRAM.COM (Mar. 19, 2012), 
https://www.telegram.com/article/20120319/column44/103199958 [https://perma.cc/9YKZ-B5NS] 
(describing some homeowners as “one tax bill away from being homeless” as a result of this policy); 
see, e.g., Tallage, 23 LCR at 375–76 n.3 (stating that the Meaneys lost all equity in their family home, 
valued at $270,000, for missing a single water bill and sewer bill totaling $1,052.84). 
 20 See Tallage, 23 LCR at 377, 380 (detailing the redemption amounts for two properties as four-
teen times and thirteen times the original municipal bills owed, within two years of the missed pay-
ment); see also id. at 382 (listing the itemized components of the redemption amount demanded by the 
private investor lienholder, for an original missed payment of $492.51: “Principal paid at auction: 
$626.24, Interest and fees paid at auction: $552.04, Principal interest (post auction): $75, Recording 
cost of collector’s deed: $125, Recording cost-2011 tax payment certificate: $75, Recording adminis-
trative fee (2011 tax certificate): $75, Tax lien foreclosure petition deposit with the Land Court: $515, 
Supplemental title and other services: $137 . . . Administrative fee (final decree): $200, Administra-
tive fee (withdrawal/vacate): $200, Closing costs (to HIGCO) (deed stamps, etc.): $884, Legal fees- 
Law Offices of Daniel C. Hill: $30,612, TOTAL: $30,612.24”). 
 21 See Amicus Brief for Nat’l Tax Lien Ass’n at 8, Popowicz v. City of Worcester, No. 10 TL 
141224 (Mass. Land Ct. Dec. 7, 2012) [hereinafter NTLA Amicus Brief] (explaining that property 
taxes are the main source of municipal funding and describing delinquent taxes as a “vital threat” to a 
city’s financial health). The National Tax Lien Association (NTLA) points out that delinquent proper-
ty taxes can force municipalities to meet the budget in other ways: by cutting services or by raising 
rates for the taxpayers who do pay. Id. Additionally, when municipalities do not enforce taxes, people 
may realize the lack of consequences and respond by being less vigilant about paying their taxes, 
increasing the rate of delinquency in the municipality. Id. 
 22 Id. The NTLA discusses many important public services that municipalities provide, including 
public health services, infrastructure projects, library facilities, recreation programs, and local gov-
ernment activities such as zoning boards, judicial systems, and waste management programs. Id. 
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and decreases the quality of services that a town can offer to its citizens.23 Alt-
hough it is important to create mechanisms to encourage taxpayers to pay their 
property taxes, few states have adequate safeguards to protect the most vulner-
able in society: the poor, sick, and elderly.24 Selling tax liens may offer munic-
ipalities a quick way to get cash for outstanding liens, 25 however, regardless of 
the benefits, selling tax liens to private parties poses several policy issues.26 
The privatization of delinquent tax liens has disproportionality affected 
poor and minority communities on a national scale, beginning with its ugly 
history and deeply racist implications.27 Throughout history, minority neigh-
borhoods have been the subject of lowered property values due to segregation 
and red-lining practices.28 Areas that have recently experienced gentrification 
and rapid increases in property values are particularly vulnerable as property 
taxes skyrocket.29 Longtime property owners struggle to keep up with higher 
tax rates, and the tax liens are particularly appealing to investors because of the 
significant upside if they can foreclose.30 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See id. (explaining the many services that local municipalities are responsible for providing and 
suggesting that the consequence of budget deficits would be harmful to the community). 
 24 See, e.g., Sallah et al., supra note 1 (explaining that the District of Columbia’s tax lien policy 
did not provide proper safeguards, as opposed to New York City, where tax liens cannot be sold on 
homes that are owned by veterans, low-income elderly people, or the disabled). 
 25 NTLA Amicus Brief, supra note 21, at 7. By selling the liens, the municipality removes any 
risk of nonpayment because the purchaser takes on all of the responsibility of enforcing the liens. Id. 
Additionally, the municipality does not have to pay the costs and expenses of enforcing the liens. See 
Susan Spencer, Towns Selling Liens for Unpaid Property Taxes, TELEGRAM.COM (Nov. 5, 2011), 
https://www.telegram.com/article/20111105/NEWS/111059960 [https://perma.cc/9NTJ-C6EZ] (stat-
ing that the collector’s offices are able to forego the costly and time-consuming process of tax debt 
collection). 
 26 See generally RAO, supra note 10 (describing the undesirable consequences that often occur 
when public welfare is in the hands of a private entity focused on profit). 
 27 See Andrew W. Kahrl, Unconscionable: Tax Delinquency Sales as a Form of Dignity Taking, 
92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 905, 905–06 (2018) (highlighting the disproportionate cost of property tax 
throughout history in the United States and how property tax was a tool used to discriminate against 
African American property owners); id. at 910 (describing property tax assessment and enforcement 
procedures as tools used by white supremacists to purposely target African American communities, 
particularly in the South). 
 28 See id. at 905–06 (describing the African American community’s increased vulnerability to 
predatory tax buying as a result of decades of red-lining and over-taxation). This practice has affected 
the African American community by preventing involvement in real estate markets, contributing to 
the decline of black landownership, and intensifying the racial wealth gap. Id. at 906. 
 29 Id. at 905. 
 30 See id. at 914 (citing examples of predatory tax buying and racially motivated leveraging of the 
tax lien system to displace African Americans or strip people of their property). For example, Evelina 
Jenkins, an African American woman who owned an island on the coast of South Carolina, was duped 
by a white man who befriended her and convinced her to let him manage her finances. Id. He deliber-
ately allowed the property to fall into tax delinquency, purchased the lien at auction, and then quickly 
sold the land to a developer and had Evelina evicted. Id. Evelina, left penniless and homeless, was 
forced to move into her daughter’s trailer home where she later died with nothing. Id. Currently, the 
island is populated with dozens of homes, all valued at over half a million dollars. Id. 
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Massachusetts’ privatization of delinquent tax liens and treatment of sur-
plus is harmful public policy and likely unconstitutional because of the adverse 
outcomes the practice enables.31 There are safeguards and simple statutory 
changes that states can make to properly provide municipalities with the tools 
they need to collect outstanding property taxes without jeopardizing the homes 
of underprivileged and vulnerable citizens.32 Although the Massachusetts Land 
Court is able to catch egregious cases and prevent injustice in some instances, 
the citizens who are most likely to need protection are those who are least like-
ly to have sufficient resources or the knowledge to get help.33 
Part I of this Note provides the history and overview of delinquent prop-
erty tax liens in Massachusetts.34 Part II discusses the effects that the privatiza-
tion of delinquent property tax liens and the treatment of surplus have on 
homeowners and municipal budgets, and potential Takings Clause implica-
tions.35 Part III argues that due to the disparate impact on vulnerable members 
of society and windfall benefits to investors, the privatization of delinquent 
property tax liens as it is currently practiced in Massachusetts is poor public 
policy and likely unconstitutional.36 
I. HISTORY AND OVERVIEW OF THE PRIVATIZATION OF  
DELINQUENT PROPERTY TAX LIENS 
Privatizing delinquent property tax liens has conventionally been consid-
ered a resource for municipalities to collect due taxes and fund community 
services.37 In reality, the privatization of these debts in various municipalities, 
including those in Massachusetts, have led to unfavorable results for some of 
the most vulnerable members of society—such as the sick and elderly.38 Sec-
tion A of this Part provides the background and procedure of the privatization 
                                                                                                                           
 31 See generally RAO, supra note 10 (providing examples of vulnerable members of society ex-
ploited by this policy and discussing various harmful effects that privatization can cause across the 
United States); Clifford, supra note 18 (arguing that Massachusetts’ tax lien statute’s treatment of 
surplus from tax lien foreclosure sales is a violation of the Takings Clause). 
 32 See RAO, supra note 10, at 19–41 (suggesting multiple remedies for states to adopt to address 
these issues and provide additional protections for citizens without jeopardizing the municipalities’ 
ability to collect delinquent property taxes). 
 33 See Tallage, 23 LCR at 376 (stating that the Land Court has statutory authority to use its dis-
cretion to vacate judgments “after careful consideration and in instances where it is required to ac-
complish justice” if brought within one year of the judgment); RAO, supra note 10, at 5 (noting that 
tax sale procedures are excessively complicated and that “homeowners most at risk are those who 
have fallen into default because they are incapable of handling their financial affairs”). 
 34 See infra notes 37–133 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra notes 134–207 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 208–257 and accompanying text. 
 37 See NTLA Amicus Brief, supra note 21, at 7–8 (describing the services provided by municipal-
ities and funded primarily by property taxes). 
 38 See Tallage, 23 LCR at 378–81 (detailing how this policy led a family to financial disaster 
when the wife and mother suddenly became severely ill). 
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of delinquent property tax liens in Massachusetts, detailing the statutory 
scheme that enables the system to operate, and highlighting recent trends with-
in the state.39 Section B describes solutions that other states have implemented 
in response to concerns about the potential harmful effects of this policy.40  
A. Overview of Tax Lien Sales in Massachusetts 
All fifty states have adopted statutes that authorize the creation of a lien 
on residential property when the owner does not pay property taxes.41 Because 
municipalities rely primarily on property taxes for funding, it is important for 
towns and cities to be able to collect this money from their residents.42 Munic-
ipalities often have tight budgets and are responsible for critical services like 
schools, police, and firefighting services.43 Twenty-eight states currently allow 
municipalities to sell tax liens to private entities to generate income, essentially 
trading the rights of collection to private investors in exchange for immediate 
cash.44 The lien purchaser then takes on the costs and efforts of enforcement, 
freeing up municipal resources.45 
In Massachusetts, courts have historically recognized the reciprocal duties 
of the Commonwealth to protect the property within its limits and that of the 
resident to pay taxes proportional to its protection.46 When a taxpayer fails to 
meet his tax obligation to the municipality, the legislature has created several 
                                                                                                                           
 39 See infra notes 41–102 and accompanying text. 
 40 See infra notes 103–133 and accompanying text. 
 41 RAO, supra note 10, at 11. In some states, taxes include ad valorem property tax assessments, 
which are calculated based on a percentage of the value of the property. Id. Some states also allow 
municipalities to include sewer charges or unpaid water bills. Id. 
 42 NTLA Amicus Brief, supra note 21, at 8. The National Tax Lien Association reported that, in 
2012 alone, tax investors provided over $1.5 billion to municipalities in the United States. NAT’L TAX 
LIEN ASS’N, THE NATIONAL TAX LIEN ASSOCIATION’S RESPONSE TO THE NATIONAL CONSUMER 
LAW CENTER’S REPORT 2 (2012), https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.ntla.org/resource/resmgr/press_kit/
the_national_tax_lien_associ.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BD5-9DDS]. 
 43 NTLA Amicus Brief, supra note 21, at 8. The NTLA points out that municipalities use real 
estate tax revenue to provide for services and programs such as: education, public safety services, 
public health construction and maintenance of infrastructure, park maintenance, public libraries, rec-
reational programs, and local government services including planning and zoning, judicial systems, 
and waste management. Id. 
 44 Id. at 7. 
 45 See Memorandum in Response to the Court’s Request, Dated November 5, 2012, for Amici 
Submissions in the Above Referenced Cases at 2–3, Popowicz, No. 10 TL 141224 (Mass. Land Ct. 
Nov. 5, 2012) [hereinafter City of Worcester Amicus Brief] (noting that, in Worcester, investors pay 
the $125 cost to record the tax collector’s deed, saving the city $81,750 over 2010–2012). The city 
also saved $379,320 over this time by avoiding the $580 cost of making a deposit with the Land Court 
for each foreclosure complaint and recording the Notice of Filing the Complaint. Id. This amount is 
recoverable by the investor upon the homeowner’s redemption of the tax title. Id. 
 46 See WB & T Mortg. Co. v. Bd. of Assessors, 889 N.E.2d 404, 410 (Mass. 2008) (articulating 
the belief that individual citizens should contribute to society in proportion to the worth of their prop-
erty derives from the long history of proportional and reasonable taxation). 
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remedies to enable the town to collect: levy by distress and sale of goods; a 
request for a hearing; commencement of an action, such as an action of con-
tract; and an action to foreclose the right of redemption in the Land Court after 
establishing a tax title.47 In the early 1990s, a budget crisis led legislators to al-
low private entities to purchase delinquent property tax liens.48 The law was 
considered a creative way for municipalities to increase much-needed revenue.49 
There are 351 independent municipalities within the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, each with the power to pursue unpaid property taxes.50 These 
municipalities are free to establish their own procedures and guidelines for tax 
collection, which allows for significant variation in how taxes are pursued and 
enforced.51 Additionally, tax collectors do not need any municipal approval to 
act or execute a tax deed, and no municipal entity has the authority to reverse 
or change decisions of the tax collectors.52 
The most popular form of delinquent property tax collection in Massa-
chusetts is the foreclosure of the municipality’s tax title or tax lien.53 The pro-
                                                                                                                           
 47 Ch. 60, §§ 24, 29, 35, 40–50, 53 (levy by distress and sale of goods, request for a hearing, 
commencement of action, tax sales, and tax deed sales to third parties, respectively). These remedies 
are cumulative, meaning they are not exclusive and can be used in conjunction with one another. City 
of Boston v. Gordon, 175 N.E.2d 377, 381 (Mass. 1961). 
 48 Chris Burrell, Tax Lien Law Haunts Massachusetts Property Owners, WGBH NEWS (Jan. 21, 
2018), https://www.wgbh.org/news/2018/01/21/local-news/tax-lien-law-haunts-massachusetts-property-
owners [https://perma.cc/587W-X7GU]. The budget crisis left cities and towns desperate for a way to 
increase revenue and cash flow. Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 See ch. 60, § 53 (providing that each municipality, through its tax collector, may take land for 
the town if property taxes on that land are unpaid); Clifford, supra note 18, at 297 (noting that the 
Commonwealth has 351 independent municipalities). Each municipality runs their taxation system 
separately. Clifford, supra note 18, at 297–98. Each municipality determines how to train and set 
standards for the tax collectors. Id. There is no statewide minimum standard for tax collectors. Id. at 
298. In Gosnold, for example, the Tax Collector is a part-time position held by a teacher on Martha’s 
Vineyard with no experience with tax deeds. Id. at 298. 
 51 See Clifford, supra note 18, at 298 (suggesting that due to the high degree of independence of 
tax collectors, there are a wide array of methods adopted). For example, in the small town of Russell, 
Massachusetts, there were no formal procedural guidelines for handling tax titles and staff members 
often had to take dual roles in the local government. Town of Russell v. Barlow, 24 LCR 404, 408 
(Mass. Land Ct. 2016). The town treasurer served as both the collector and treasurer and had to manu-
ally record payments in a cashbook. Id. at 408–09. Before 2004, the treasurer monitored tax title prop-
erties by simply drawing a red check mark on the list to demonstrate that subsequent taxes were certi-
fied at the end of the year. Id. at 409. This method was not mandated by any formal policy or proce-
dure; rather, it was used simply because it was the former collector’s preferred method. Id. 
 52 Clifford, supra note 18, at 298. Another implication of this is that the taxpayer has no statutory 
avenue to challenge a decision that taxes are owed before title is taken by the tax collector. Id. at 300. 
Tax collectors can force the taxpayer out of their home and grant possession to the town immediately, 
without any prior judicial review. Id. 
 53 Robert J. Kerwin, Municipal Collection by Foreclosure of Tax Title, 83 MASS. L. REV. 77, 77 
(1988). 
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cess begins when a taxpayer does not pay the amount owed to the town.54 Thir-
ty days past due, interest begins to accrue at an annual rate of fourteen per-
cent.55 A statutory lien arises for delinquent property taxes on January first, 
after the year of assessment, in the amount of the tax due.56 The municipality 
must make a formal demand to the taxpayer, and if the demand is not answered 
within fourteen days, the tax collector may then send a notice of tax taking.57 
Within sixty days of the notice, the municipality records an instrument of tak-
ing at the Registry of Deeds, which vests title in the municipality subject to the 
property owner’s right of redemption.58 The “taking” occurs when the instru-
ment is recorded, and from that point, interest accrues at an annual rate of six-
teen percent.59 
Traditionally, municipal tax collectors then proceed against the home-
owner.60 Municipalities can cooperate with taxpayers to enter into payment 
plans or reduce the amount owed in order to facilitate the taxpayer’s redemp-
tion.61 The process allows for a measure of discretion, and local tax collectors 
tend to be responsive to their residents’ special circumstances and needs.62 In 
the absence of an agreement, municipalities can bring action in the Land Court 
by filing a petition for foreclosure of the taxpayer’s right of redemption.63 The 
                                                                                                                           
 54 See Tallage, 23 LCR at 376–77 (explaining the enforcement framework regarding collection of 
unpaid taxes, which, obviously, begins when taxes are not paid). 
 55 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 59, § 57 (West 2019). 
 56 Ch. 60, § 37. 
 57 Id. § 53 (“If a tax on land is not paid within fourteen days after demand therefor and remains 
unpaid at the date of the taking, the collector may take such land for the town, first giving fourteen 
days’ notice of his intention to exercise such power of taking . . . .”). 
 58 Id. §§ 54, 62. If the taking is not recorded within sixty days of the notice, it is not valid. Id. 
§ 54. The right of redemption enables the owner, or otherwise interested party, to retrieve tax title of 
the property if they pay the entire amount owed. Id. § 62; Kerwin, supra note 53, at 79. 
 59 Ch. 60 § 62; Kerwin, supra note 53, at 79. “Taking” is defined as “the act of seizing an article, 
with or without removing it, but with an implicit transfer or possession or control.” Taking, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5. The instrument of taking must include cause, a description of the 
property, the name of the owner, amount of the tax due, and all costs and expenses associated with the 
taking. Ch. 60, § 54. Recording the taking also creates a lien for all later taxes that become due and 
unpaid. Kerwin, supra note 53, at 79. 
 60 See Tallage, 23 LCR at 377 (explaining that, until relatively recently, foreclosure actions have 
been brought primarily by municipalities). 
 61 Ch. 60, § 62A (granting authority to municipalities to enter in agreements with the taxpayers 
attempting to redeem property subject to tax title). The statute imposes limits on the agreements that 
the municipalities may make, such as the maximum term is limited to five years, and agreements 
made after the taking has occurred must mandate an initial payment of at least 25% of the redemption 
amount. Id. 
 62 See Tallage, 23 LCR at 377 (comparing the role of a municipal tax collector to a District Attor-
ney’s office, because both are within the political process and operate with a level of discretion that 
allows officials to take circumstances into account). 
 63 See ch. 60, § 62A (stating that the tax authority cannot bring an action during the payment 
agreement time frame if the taxpayer is in compliance with the terms of the agreement); id. § 65 (stat-
ing that municipalities can file a petition for foreclosure six months after the taking has occurred). If 
the land is deemed abandoned, cities and towns can bring a petition as soon as the taking occurs. Id. 
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Land Court has authority to impose terms and conditions of payment to allow 
the property owner to redeem “as justice and the circumstances warrant” and 
will issue a written finding.64 If the taxpayer does not appear, the court will 
typically issue a default finding in favor of the municipality.65 After the court 
issues its finding, the municipality must file a separate motion for entry of a 
decree or of a judgment of foreclosure stating that the taxpayer did not comply 
with the terms of the agreement.66 The Land Court then issues a judgment of 
foreclosure, which extinguishes the former owner’s right of redemption and 
vests absolute title in the municipality.67 The final step for a municipality is to 
sell the acquired property at public auction.68 
Rather than proceeding themselves, some municipalities prefer to sell tax 
deeds or receivables to private investors.69 Currently, several dozen munici-
palities in Massachusetts choose to auction off tax lien debt to private enti-
ties.70 Before the auction, the municipality must publish a notice describing the 
properties that have liens that they plan to sell.71 Then, a private investor pur-
chases the taxpayer’s debt by paying the municipality the amount of the tax 
                                                                                                                           
The petition must include a description of the land, the assessed valuation, and the petitioner’s source 
of title. Id. For more information regarding the tax title foreclosure process, see Kerwin, supra note 
53, at 80–81, which provides detail about the statutory procedures the Land Court will follow for a tax 
title petition. 
 64 Ch. 60, § 68. This allows the court to consider whether the property owner can meet the finan-
cial burden and set the terms for an agreement within the statutory parameters. Id. 
 65 See id. § 69 (permitting the Land Court to issue a default finding when the taxpayer fails to 
appear); Kerwin, supra note 53, at 81 (noting the frequency of these default findings). 
 66 Kerwin, supra note 53, at 81. 
 67 Ch. 60, § 64. After foreclosure, the municipality takes absolute title free and clear of any inter-
est on the property, including mortgage interests, and the former owner’s equity interest. Kerwin, 
supra note 53, at 79. The property remains subject to easements and restrictions. Id. at 82. 
 68 See ch. 60, § 77B (granting authority to the appointed custodian of a town or city to sell by 
public auction land that has been acquired through tax title foreclosure). 
 69 Id. § 2C (allowing municipalities to sell tax receivables to third parties and defining “tax re-
ceivable” as “the right to receive payment of taxes assessed and due on real and personal property”); 
id. § 52 (permitting cities and towns to sell tax deeds to third parties). Municipalities are afforded 
significant discretion regarding whether or not to sell their tax liens and many choose to handle tax 
collection themselves. See Jennifer McKim, Homeowners Sold Out by Cities? Investors Buy Tax Liens 
and Foreclose, NECIR (Nov. 23, 2014), https://www.necir.org/2014/11/23/tax-liens/ [https://perma.
cc/ZE82-QB8M] (explaining that officials from Boston, Attleboro, and Norton prefer not to privatize 
tax liens due to ethical reasons). Some cities dislike the loss of control over the outcome of the fore-
closure process that occurs when the city sells the liens. Id. Others, such as the treasurer of Attleboro, 
explained that selling the liens was more trouble than it was worth due to complications sales may 
pose in chains of title and the impacts they have on financially distressed homeowners. Id. 
 70 Chris Burrell, Some Cities Are Cashing in on Homeowners’ Tax Debts, and Making Foreclo-
sure More Likely, WGBH (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.wgbh.org/news/local-news/2019/01/21/some-
cities-are-cashing-in-on-homeowners-tax-debts-and-making-foreclosure-more-likely [https://perma.
cc/VX7C-RTPE]. 
 71 Ch. 60, § 2C. The municipality must publish the list at least sixty days prior to the sale. Id. The 
taxpayer’s failure to receive this notice does not affect the validity of the assignment of the title to the 
purchaser. Id. § 52. 
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account.72 The municipal tax collector records a collector’s deed, rather than 
an instrument of taking, which assigns title to the purchaser subject to the 
homeowner’s right of redemption.73 To exercise the right of redemption, the 
taxpayer must pay the lienholder the delinquent taxes due plus interest, as well 
as the lienholder’s costs, expenses, and fees.74 If the taxpayer does not redeem 
within six months of the sale, the lienholder can file a petition in the Land 
Court to foreclose the right of redemption.75 Interest on the delinquent tax still 
accrues at a rate of 14–16%, and after the Land Court enters a judgment of 
foreclosure, the former owner’s right of redemption is extinguished and abso-
lute title vests in the lienholder.76 
Regardless of whether the foreclosing party is a municipality or private 
entity, the tax title becomes absolute after the Land Court issues a final judg-
ment of foreclosure.77 The foreclosing party takes title free and clear of any 
existing interests in the property, including the prior owner’s entire equity 
stake.78 Unlike mortgage foreclosures, the foreclosing party does not have an 
obligation to give surplus proceeds from the sale to the former owner.79 
                                                                                                                           
 72 See id. § 52. (allowing a municipality to sell tax titles to third parties for an amount not less 
than the amount required for redemption). 
 73 See id. § 45 (requiring the tax collector to issue a collector’s deed to the purchaser, and stating, 
“the deed shall convey the land to the purchaser, subject to the right of redemption [and t]he title thus 
conveyed shall, until redemption or until the right of redemption is foreclosed . . . be held as security 
for the repayment of the purchase price, with all intervening costs, terms imposed for redemption and 
charges, with interest thereon”). 
 74 Id. § 62. The petitioning party can be awarded costs of the proceeding and “such counsel fee as 
the court deems reasonable.” Id. § 68. 
 75 Id. § 65; see Tallage, 23 LCR at 376 n.6 (stating that, in Massachusetts, the Land Court has 
exclusive jurisdiction over these types of actions). 
 76 Ch. 59, § 57 (interest accrues at 14% before the taking); ch. 60, §§ 62, 64 (stating interest ac-
crues at 16% after the taking has occurred and granting absolute title to tax deed holder after the court 
enters the foreclosure of the right of redemption). In the current economic climate, banks provide 
interest on savings accounts for a fraction of 1%. RAO, supra note 10, at 4. Tax liens, on the other 
hand, can earn returns of a national average of 18% and as high as 50%, in some states. Id. 
 77 Ch. 60, § 64. Absolute tax title means that neither the property owner, nor any other party with 
an ownership interest, such as mortgagees, attaching creditors, or lienors, have any claim, then or in 
the future, to any or all of the property. Tallage, 23 LCR at 377. 
 78 Ch. 60, § 64; Town of Sandwich v. Quirk, 566 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Mass. 1991) (“[T]he absolute 
title proclaimed by § 64 clears the record title so that the municipality may sell the property or keep it 
for municipal purposes, free of the claims of the prior owner and other persons whose rights are extin-
guished.”). 
 79 Compare ch. 60, § 64 (stating that title after tax foreclosure is absolute), and Tallage, 23 LCR 
at 377 (stating that the foreclosing party in a tax foreclosure is entitled to all surplus from the foreclo-
sure), with MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 183, § 27 (West 2019) (providing the framework for disposi-
tion of proceeds in a mortgage foreclosure and requiring the surplus from such foreclosure, after costs 
and expenses, to be returned to the former homeowner). For more information regarding the judicial 
foreclosure process, see Roman Ibragimov, Note, Fighting the Undead: Why States Should Use 
Forced Vesting to Kill Zombie Mortgages, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1279, 1285–86 (2019), which describes 
the judicial and non-judicial foreclosure processes. 
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After the foreclosure judgment is entered, the taxpayer can file a motion to 
vacate within one year of the judgment.80 The Land Court has the authority to 
vacate the judgment in extreme circumstances if “required to show justice.”81 
This remedy is rare—despite over two thousand redemption foreclosures filed 
annually, the Land Court has considered cases to vacate a judgement of foreclo-
sure only sixteen times since 1993.82 This remedy is further limited because an 
aggrieved taxpayer must file the motion within one year, absent a violation of 
due process.83 Failure to make a timely filing is an absolute bar on future peti-
tions to vacate the judgment, no matter how inequitable the result.84 
Tax lien sales are prevalent in Massachusetts because they are lucrative 
for both municipalities and investors.85 Because the tax deed holder keeps all 
surplus from the sale, this policy allows the town or private purchasers to ac-
                                                                                                                           
 80 Ch. 60, § 69A; Tallage, 23 LCR at 377 (stating that the Land Court has the authority to grant a 
motion to vacate if it is brought within one year of the judgment). 
 81 Tallage, 23 LCR at 376–77 (quoting Sharon v. Kafka, 468 N.E.2d 656, 658 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1984)) (explaining that the court has discretion “after careful consideration and in instances where it is 
required to accomplish justice” to vacate the judgement of foreclosure). 
 82 See Sharon, 468 N.E.2d at 658 (stating that vacating a decree of foreclosure is “extraordinary 
in nature and ought to be granted only after careful consideration and in instances where . . . [it is] 
required to accomplish justice”); Clifford, supra note 18, at 281–82 nn.39, 43 (stating that there were 
only sixteen instances of this issue in Land Court records and over 2,200 foreclosures filed in the year 
studied). 
 83 See ch. 60, § 69A (providing aggrieved taxpayers one year to file a motion); Barlow, 24 LCR at 
411 (quoting Town of Andover v. State Fin. Servs., Inc., 736 N.E.2d 837, 841 (Mass. 2000)) (“Fol-
lowing this one-year period, the statute imposes an absolute bar on petitions to vacate.”). The strict 
one-year limit is designed to provide clarity of title by efficiently making final determinations on 
disputes about public takings. Barlow, 24 LCR at 411. A violation of due process excuses the one-
year limit and is usually found based on failure of taxpayer’s ability to participate in litigation or inad-
equate notice. Id. 
 84 Ch. 60, § 69A; see Sharon, 468 N.E.2d at 658 (interpreting the statute and holding that, alt-
hough mental illness or incapacity may be sufficient for a judge to exercise discretion and vacate a 
judgment of foreclosure, it was insufficient to allow a judge to exercise this discretion past the one-
year window). In Sharon, the trial judge granted petitions to vacate foreclosures in 1981 that had been 
entered in 1976. 468 N.E.2d at 657. The lower court’s grounds for vacating the foreclosure were that 
the taxpayer was an elderly widow who experienced severe disabilities that resulted in her prolonged 
hospitalization, brain surgeries, and, as a result, she was generally unable to handle her personal af-
fairs. Id. The Massachusetts Appeals Court found that her failing health and mental incapacity were 
insufficient to vacate the decree based on the statutory language in § 69A. Id. at 658. To rise to the 
level of severity required to make a showing of violation of due process, a taxpayer must plead facts 
to meet the standard established by Covey v. Somers. Id. (citing Covey v. Somers, 351 U.S. 141, 146–
47 (1956)). To do so, the petitioner must make a showing that the taxpayer was incompetent, without 
the protection of a guardian, and the municipal authorities knew that the petitioner was an unprotected 
incompetent when they sent the notice. Id. 
 85 See, e.g., Mike Lawrence, New Bedford Nets $3.1 Million in First Sale of Property Tax Debts to 
Private Company, SOUTHCOASTTODAY (June 17, 2016), https://www.southcoasttoday.com/news/2016
0517/new-bedford-nets-31-million-in-first-sale-of-property-tax-debts-to-private-company [https://perma.
cc/Z4PW-E9NR] (stating that the town of New Bedford brought in $3.1 million in its first auction, with 
one single investor buying up all 180 liens, and the investor will be able to collect 16% interest on these 
debts). 
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quire valuable property and earn significant returns on a small investment.86 
Through this process, municipalities in Massachusetts collect $56 million more 
than they are owed in delinquent taxes per year, meaning municipalities col-
lected $42.87 for every delinquent dollar.87 
Municipalities also benefit from the ability to collect premiums from pur-
chasers over the actual amount of the lien.88 Worcester, for example, has col-
lected $2.6 million from investors over the amount of delinquent taxes actually 
owed in the past three years because of the competitive bidding process.89 
Worcester keeps the premium if the home is foreclosed, but returns the premi-
um if the homeowner redeems.90 This structure aligns the interests of the city 
with the private investor and incentivizes municipalities to promote tax delin-
quencies and foreclosures.91 In Massachusetts, the privatization of delinquent 
property tax liens has gone hand in hand with an increase in the rate of tax 
foreclosure.92 
                                                                                                                           
 86 See Tallage, 23 LCR at 375 (describing the return on investment for these purchases as “astro-
nomical”). 
 87 Clifford, supra note 18, at 282–83. Clifford conducted a study in which he looked at Land Court 
records from August 1, 2013, through July 21, 2014. Id. at 282. The period of time was selected as a 
sample size as most cases were likely to have had a final judgment entered. Id. He found 2,260 redemp-
tion foreclosures filed in this time. Id. From this pool Clifford chose 5%—114 files—at random to be the 
sample size. Id. at 283. He found that Massachusetts municipalities collected $57,963,000 to pay 
$1,352,000 of outstanding taxes—$56.6 million more than was owed by taxpayers. Id. at 284. The aver-
age value of tax liens being sold in the time period studied was $4,177. Id. at 283. The range was $26–
$66,642. Id. The average assessed property value was $258,462. Id. The range was $1,300–$2,295,100 
based on fair cash valuation. Id. 
 88 See Burrell, supra note 70 (stating that, at Worcester’s 2018 auction, tax lien debts for small 
amounts set off bidding wars that resulted in investors paying much more to the city than was owed in 
delinquent taxes). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. The city returns the premium to the lien purchaser if the property is not ultimately fore-
closed upon. Id. Lowell and Pittsfield, two Massachusetts towns, keep the premium regardless of 
whether the home is ultimately foreclosed. Id. In 2012 alone, Lowell received $96,000 worth of pre-
miums from private investors above and beyond what the taxpayers owed. Id. 
 91 See id. (explaining that critics dislike the practice for the incentives it creates for municipalities 
to side with private investors rather than promoting the interests of resident homeowners). Municipali-
ties are incentivized to encourage tax delinquencies in order to sell them at auction for a premium. Id. 
For example, Michelle Cook, a Worcester resident, was laid off and fell behind on local property taxes 
for a duplex that had been owned by her family for generations. Id. Her tax bill of $2,000 quickly 
multiplied and at auction the lien sold for a premium of $15,000 over what Cook actually owed. Id. 
The investor sold her home for $132,000, which meant that the city made a profit of $15,000, and the 
investor took home a windfall on the investment. Id. 
 92 See McKim, supra note 69 (illustrating the trends in tax lien foreclosures since 2008). Since 
2012, several private investment companies have brought over 1,100 claims to foreclose. Id. Although 
towns and cities also have the same ability to foreclose on the homes of delinquent taxpayers, profit 
driven companies have greater incentives to foreclose and charge high interest rates. Id. Once the liens 
are sold to private investors, the municipalities “lose[] all control over the fate of the properties.” Id. 
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The rate of foreclosure filings has steadily increased in the past years.93 In 
Massachusetts, private investment companies have filed over one thousand 
cases seeking to foreclose on delinquent taxpayers since 2012.94 One Boston 
tax lien company doubled its rate of foreclosures in Massachusetts over the 
past four years.95 Since 2015, one investment company has brought over forty 
eviction cases in the state, half of which were in Quincy alone.96 From these 
actions, 130 people faced eviction from their homes, often with little notice.97 
In 2010, lienholders filed sixty-three tax foreclosure petitions, but in 2013, the 
number jumped to 466.98 
Because of this influx, agencies offering free or low-cost legal services 
have noticed “a tidal wave of tax title problems” from low-income and elderly 
taxpayers.99 Seniors are particularly vulnerable to increased tax rates because 
they typically survive on a fixed income after retirement.100 Additionally, when 
faced with growing tax bills, many people are simply unaware of the crushing 
consequences.101 Others are confused and overwhelmed by the process, but do 
not know whom to contact about issues.102 
                                                                                                                           
 93 Id. In 2008, there was one tax foreclosure filed in Massachusetts. Id. In 2012, there were 471, 
and in 2013, 466 according to Land Court records. Id. 
 94 Id. Massachusetts cities such as Worcester, Lawrence, and Lowell suffered big losses after the 
2008 housing crisis. Id. The executive director of a Lowell nonprofit, Homeowner Options for Massa-
chusetts Elders, stated that there has been a “tidal wave of tax title problems.” Id. 
 95 Burrell, supra note 48. In 2014, Tallage reported it had purchased over five hundred tax title 
accounts in Massachusetts. McKim, supra note 69. By 2018, Tallage had purchased over two thou-
sand. Burrell, supra note 48. 
 96 Burrell, supra note 48. In Lowell, real estate records indicate that Tallage LLC sold off dozens 
of properties that it purchased though the tax lien foreclosure process since 2012. Id. This has allowed 
Tallage to earn four times its initial investment. Id. Since 2016, Tallage has filed eighteen eviction 
cases in Quincy. Id. 
 97 Id. Tallage contests this number, arguing that most properties acquired were unoccupied. Id. 
Tallage also claims that when the company evicts tenants, it volunteers to pay the costs of relocation. 
Id. Madeline Lahssak, a Quincy resident evicted by Tallage through the tax lien foreclosure process, 
says that she was unaware of the proceedings until someone came to her home and told her that she 
had twenty-fours to accept an offer of $10,000 to move out within sixty days. Id. Lahssak informed 
reporters that the cash offer would not be very helpful, as she was poor and relied on subsidized rent. 
Id. Rosa Silva and her family were unaware that their duplex, valued at $389,000, had been foreclosed 
by Tallage for only $31,000. Id. Silva was given only twenty-eight days of notice. Id. 
 98 McKim, supra note 69. 
 99 Id. (quoting Len Raymond, the executive director of the nonprofit organization Homeowner 
Options for Massachusetts Elders, based in Lowell). 
 100 Burrell, supra note 48. 
 101 See McKim, supra note 69 (describing an increasing number of low-income and elderly cli-
ents seeking assistance who were “shocked” to learn the ramifications of inability to pay taxes). 
 102 See Burrell, supra note 48. (stating that fear and confusion are more prevalent in the tax lien 
foreclosure process than in typical mortgage proceedings because in the latter, the mortgagee at least 
knows who the owner is and who to contact). 
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B. State Remedies 
Many states, including Massachusetts, have taken initiatives to implement 
changes to tax lien collection procedures in order to address some of the policy 
issues posed by privatizing delinquent property taxes.103 Massachusetts has 
enacted three major safeguards to protect vulnerable homeowners.104 First, the 
municipality has the discretion to reduce interest owed and structure payment 
plans for the owner.105 Second, the municipality can reduce the principal 
amount owed by applying to the Commissioner of the Department of Reve-
nue.106 Third, the Legislature has given the Land Court the authority to estab-
lish a timeframe in which the property owner is allowed to redeem and to “im-
pose such other terms as justice and the circumstances warrant.”107 This in-
cludes the power to vacate a judgment of foreclosure if the motion is brought 
within a year after the judgement was entered.108 Municipalities have also in-
dividually enacted certain initiatives aimed primarily at protecting elderly and 
low-income citizens.109 Newburyport, for example, allows taxpayers who earn 
less than $66,000 per year and are over the age of sixty to work for the city in 
exchange for a discount on their taxes.110 Newburyport’s program adequately 
allows senior citizens to meet rising tax obligations on fixed incomes.111 
Other states have enacted similar programs that decrease, or exempt cer-
tain individuals from, property taxes due to factors such as a taxpayer’s age, 
income level, or status as a veteran, police officer, or firefighter.112 One option 
                                                                                                                           
 103 See RAO, supra note 10, at 19–41 (providing examples of various state initiatives to address 
privatizing tax liens). For example, towns in Tennessee may “freeze” the tax assessment at the amount 
it was valued at the latest of: when the town started the program, when the taxpayer turned sixty-five, 
or the year the person bought the property. Property Tax Freeze Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-5-705 
(2019). In New Hampshire, one remedy is to require tax collectors to make payment plans for redemp-
tion amounts. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80:33-a (2019). 
 104 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 58, § 8 (West 2019); ch. 60, §§ 62A, 68; see Tallage, 23 LCR at 
377 (describing these three statutes as safeguards). 
 105 Ch. 60, § 62A. 
 106 Ch. 58, § 8. 
 107 Ch. 60, § 68. This discretion includes the ability to “determine whether the party seeking to 
redeem can meet the financial burdens imposed by statute, and if he can, on what terms payment to 
the town should be made.” Town of Lynnfield v. Owners Unknown, 492 N.E.2d 86, 89 (Mass. 1986). 
 108 Ch. 60, § 69A; Tallage, 23 LCR at 377. Here, the court notes that the scope of its authority to 
act to prevent inequities has not been extensively discussed. Tallage, 23 LCR at 377. Municipalities 
largely handle the collection proceedings at a local level, so they are rarely brought to the attention of 
the state. Id. Typically, they are conducted through the local political process with a high amount of 
circumstantial consideration and discretion of local government agents. Id. 
 109 See Burrell, supra note 48 (providing examples of towns and cities that have enacted their own 
programs to protect vulnerable homeowners). 
 110 Id. Michael Murphy is a seventy-three-year-old citizen of Newburyport who works about 
ninety-five hours per year sorting recyclables for the city in exchange for a $1,500 reduction in taxes. 
Id. 
 111 Id. Newburyport estimates that about eighty residents utilize this program. Id. 
 112 RAO, supra note 10, at 19. 
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is a tax deferral program that allows taxpayers additional time to pay their tax-
es, but does not decrease the amount of revenue that the municipality will re-
ceive—it simply adjusts the timing of the revenue stream.113 Another option is 
an exemption program, such as the method adopted in Utah, in which the first 
$200,000 of a disabled veteran’s home is not taxed.114 Property taxes are re-
duced proportionally to the severity of the veteran’s disability, which allows 
for flexibility based on individual circumstances.115 
States have also implemented broad reforms in response to public back-
lash regarding the privatization of delinquent property tax liens.116 Rhode Is-
land, for example, implemented the Madeline Walker Act in 2006, which is 
designed to help financially distressed taxpayers keep their homes.117 The new 
legislation imposes notice requirements and grants Rhode Island Housing, a 
quasi-public housing entity designed to help residents with housing problems, 
the first option to purchase property tax liens before they are sold at public 
auction.118 Once Rhode Island Housing purchases liens, homeowners have five 
years to redeem rather than the typical one-year redemption period.119 A dedi-
                                                                                                                           
 113 Id. at 20. 
 114 UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-2-1104 (West 2019). The code provides that any veteran who is not 
classified as “less than 10%” disabled or is listed as classified as individually unemployable, would 
qualify for this exemption. Id. 
 115 See id. § 59-2-1104(6)(a) (stating that the amount of property value exempt under this policy is 
the percent that the veteran is disabled, multiplied by the total value of the property); § 59-2-1105(3)(a)(i) 
(providing that the determination of percentage of disability is made by a military personnel’s written 
decision). 
 116 See RAO, supra note 10, at 37 (detailing Rhode Island’s amendments to its tax statute designed 
to address this issue and explaining that it was compelled by negative media coverage of tax lien fore-
closure practices). 
 117 See 44 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-9-8.3(a) (2019) (granting the right of first refusal of tax liens sold on 
owner-occupied property of three or fewer units to the Rhode Island Housing and Mortgage Finance 
Corporation); id. § 44-9-10 (detailing notice requirements for the sale of tax liens). This amendment to 
the tax sale statute was named after an eighty-one-year-old woman who lost her home due to a missed 
sewer bill of $496. Bill Hogan, Predators Target Homes of Older Americans, AARP BULL. (Apr. 
2014), https:// www.aarp.org/money/taxes/info-2014/tax-liens-target-homeowners.html [https://perma.
cc/38DX-C4KA]. Investors purchased the lien and resold her home for $125,000. Id. Governor Donald 
Carcieri explained in a news release that the bill was designed to assist vulnerable members of society 
and provide everyone with information necessary to protect their homes. Justin Sayles, New Law Gives 
Homeowners Help from R.I. Housing, PROVIDENCE BUS. NEWS (July 22, 2006), https://pbn.com/new-
law-gives-homeowners-help-from-ri-housing21020/ [https://perma.cc/9XXW-27A7]. 
 118 RAO, supra note 10, at 37. During the notice period, Rhode Island Housing reaches out to the 
delinquent taxpayer, and if they respond, the agency will assess the cause of the delinquency and 
connect the taxpayer with resources such as legal or social services. Id. Rhode Island Housing is a 
quasi-public corporation that was formed to assist residents with housing issues. Sayles, supra note 
117. The organization’s goal is to cooperate with homeowners to refinance their homes and meet their 
tax obligations without excessive fees. Id. 
 119 Christine Dunn, Through Madeline Walker Act, R.I. Housing Has Helped Thousands Stay in 
Their Homes, PROVIDENCE J. (Nov. 26, 2015), https://www.providencejournal.com/article/20151126/
NEWS/151129444 [https://perma.cc/EM28-FM5L]. Between 2007 and 2015, Rhode Island Housing 
purchased 3,500 liens and most taxpayers were able to redeem within the five-year window. Id. 
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cated team works with the homeowners to pay off their debts, secure sources 
of financial aid, or find alternative affordable housing.120 Additionally, if 
homeowners do not answer contact attempts, a staff-member from the agency 
will go to the taxpayer’s home to ensure that the taxpayer is informed of the 
delinquency and pending proceedings.121 Prior to the change, Rhode Island 
Housing reported that the majority of serious bill delinquencies were the result 
of obstacles such as family issues, illness, or financial complications, rather than 
unwillingness to pay.122 The agency pledged to work with the residents to ad-
dress these issues and either keep their homes or protect their equity interest.123 
The District of Columbia similarly amended its tax lien statute after na-
tional outrage regarding the adverse impact of the District’s practices, brought 
to light by the Washington Post in 2013.124 In response, the mayor of the Dis-
trict halted home sales of certain groups, such as the elderly and veterans, and 
the D.C. Council approved the change in 2014.125 The amended statute prohib-
its sales of tax debts under $2,500 and provides stringent notice requirements 
including invalidation of a tax sale if the District does not send one of the no-
tices.126 The most significant change to the statute, however, is that now when 
a judgement of foreclosure is entered, the purchaser of the tax lien is entitled to 
the lesser of either 10% of the surplus of the sale or $20,000.127 The rest of the 
surplus is returned to the individual whose home was foreclosed—this allows 
                                                                                                                           
 120 Id. The team includes two full-time lien specialists and a social-work oriented staff member 
who assists homeowners who need aid such as food stamps or heating. Id. This program has helped 
thousands of homeowners keep their homes. Id. The program has also helped struggling taxpayers sell 
their homes and find more affordable housing options. Id. Additionally, the agency will provide op-
portunities for the taxpayers to receive counseling and legal advice. Sayles, supra note 117. 
 121 RAO, supra note 10, at 37. Efforts were made to acknowledge the fact that many homeowners, 
such as Madeline Walker, will not respond to traditional contact attempts. Id. 
 122 Sayles, supra note 117. 
 123 Id. The spokesperson of Rhode Island Housing stated that the agency was aware that the un-
dertaking would be challenging, but was committed to protecting ownership when possible and equity 
interest when the taxpayer could not afford to keep the home. Id. 
 124 See Debbie Cenziper & Michael Sallah, Groundbreaking Protections Proposed for D.C. Home-
owners Behind on Taxes, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/
groundbreaking-protections-proposed-for-dc-homeowners-behind-on-taxes/2014/03/18/b527a5b0-aebb-
11e3-9627-c65021d6d572_story.html [https://perma.cc/6YQG-V7PW] (stating that the proposed 
legislation was instigated by the Washington Post’s investigation that exposed pervasive abusive prac-
tices); Sallah et al., supra note 1 (detailing the pattern of detrimental impact on the poorest neighbor-
hoods in Washington, D.C. that occurred as a result of the tax lien foreclosure process and enabled 
investors to snap up hundreds of homes for small tax obligations, leaving the most vulnerable citizens 
with nothing). 
 125 Hsu, supra note 6. 
 126 See D.C. CODE § 47-1332(c)(2) (2020) (prohibiting sale of tax liens under $2,500); id. § 47-
1366(b)(A) (requiring tax sale to be invalidated if the delinquent taxpayer can show that the tax col-
lector failed to provide adequate notice). 
 127 Id. § 47-1382.01(d)(4)(A).  
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investors to receive a return on the investment without enabling a windfall at 
the expense of homeowners.128 
New Hampshire has also recently confronted issues created by tax fore-
closures.129 Prior to 2001 in New Hampshire, it was common practice for the 
foreclosing party in a tax deed sale to keep all of the surplus proceeds.130 This 
changed following the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s decision in Thomas 
Tool Services v. Town of Croydon.131 The court stated that preventing a delin-
quent taxpayer from receiving the surplus proceeds from a tax sale is unduly 
harsh and an unconstitutional taking in violation of the state’s constitution.132 
The legislature amended the statute to reflect this decision and currently allows 
the municipality to retain only taxes owed, interest, costs, and fees from public 
sale of the property and granted the former homeowner a three-year window to 
bring an action in court to recover the proceeds.133 
II. DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED OPINIONS ON POLICY AND 
CONSTITUTIONALITY 
The discourse surrounding the privatization of delinquent property tax 
liens in Massachusetts centers around, first, whether it is sound public poli-
cy.134 Proponents of privatization see the policy as a wholly beneficial tool to 
help struggling communities collect debts to improve public services, while 
                                                                                                                           
 128 Id. § 47-1382.01(d)(4)(B) (requiring municipalities to give surplus proceeds from the sale to 
the former homeowner). 
 129 See Thomas Tool Servs., Inc. v. Town of Croydon, 761 A.2d 439, 441–42 (N.H. 2000) (testing 
the constitutionality of New Hampshire’s statutory alternative tax lien procedure). 
 130 Jeff Woodburn, Losing Your Home: Ignoring Unpaid Taxes Can Lead to Big Trouble—Fast, 
NH MAG. (Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.nhmagazine.com/January-2016/Losing-Your-Home/ [https://
perma.cc/2Q9G-4RND]. In New Hampshire, it is legal for municipal tax collectors to choose to sell 
tax liens to private individuals, but none currently elect to do so. Id. 
 131 761 A.2d at 441 (holding the statutory alternative tax lien procedure unconstitutional under the 
state constitution’s takings clause). 
 132 Id. The defendant town had acquired the property for a delinquent tax amount of $370.26 and 
the plaintiff taxpayer had originally purchased the home for over $65,000. Id. 
 133 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80:88(I); id. § 80:89(7); see Woodburn, supra note 130 (noting that 
the legislature’s amendment was in response to the N.H. Supreme Court decision in Thomas Tool 
Services). The amount that a municipality is entitled to is defined in N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80:90. 
The new statute was challenged in Polonsky v. Town of Bedford in 2018. 190 A.3d 400 (N.H. 2018). 
There, the former homeowner argued that the three-year limit should be inapplicable because it en-
courages municipalities to wait three years before selling the property then retaining all proceeds. Id. 
at 406. The court held that the intent was clearly to create a three-year window in which the former 
homeowner had access to the proceeds. Id. The court called on the legislature to make any changes if 
unsatisfied with this outcome. See id. (explaining that if policy judgments are to be made, the legisla-
ture is better equipped to make those decisions due to their more extensive role). 
 134 Compare RAO, supra note 10 (discussing harmful effects of the current policy and suggestions 
for change that would better serve the public interest), with NTLA Amicus Brief, supra note 21, at 8 
(describing the benefits conferred upon municipalities by this policy). 
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critics contend that this policy enables predatory tactics that punish the most 
vulnerable in society.135 
This Part summarizes the current viewpoints on the privatization of delin-
quent property tax liens and its legal implications.136 Section A describes the 
contrasting discourse regarding whether the system, as it currently operates in 
Massachusetts, is sound public policy.137 Section B discusses recent scholar-
ship that has suggested that allowing the foreclosing party to retain surplus 
proceeds from the tax sale may be an unconstitutional taking.138 
A. Policy Perspectives on the Privatization of  
Delinquent Property Tax Liens 
Policy critics and advocates have conflicting viewpoints regarding wheth-
er the privatization of delinquent property tax liens is a useful tool to collect 
unpaid taxes or if it simply allows wealthy investors to prey on the sick, poor, 
and elderly.139 Proponents of Massachusetts’ current property tax lien policy 
emphasize the many advantages that privatization provides for municipalities 
and reject the notion that privatization necessarily results in unjust out-
comes.140 One of the main benefits of the privatization of delinquent property 
tax liens is that it allows for cash-strapped municipalities to get money quick-
ly.141 In the past five years, Worcester, Lowell, New Bedford, Pittsfield, and 
                                                                                                                           
 135 See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 136 See infra notes 139–207 and accompanying text. 
 137 See infra notes 139–182 and accompanying text. 
 138 See infra notes 183–207 and accompanying text. 
 139 Compare McFarlane, supra note 19 (providing examples of individuals who suffered the loss 
of their home due to this policy), with Lawrence, supra note 85 (discussing the benefits of tax lien 
sales for towns such as New Bedford, and stating that the town made $3.1 million on its first sale of 
this type). 
 140 See Jeremy Shulkin, In Worcester, Tax Auctions Are the Norm, TELEGRAM.COM (June 11, 
2017), https://www.telegram.com/news/20170611/in-worcester-tax-auctions-are-norm [https://perma.
cc/V68V-RCEV] (stating that investors contacted were “lamenting the misconceptions around the 
industry” and describing the benefits for municipalities, such as the ability to collect quick revenue 
and not expend the resources to collect taxes themselves). See generally NTLA Amicus Brief, supra 
note 21 (defending the tax lien industry). The NTLA is an organization that considers itself to be a 
national voice for tax lien industry members within the United States. NTLA Amicus Brief, supra 
note 21, at 1. It lists its main functions as advising its members on best practices and judicial, legisla-
tive, and regulatory advocacy. Id. The NTLA prides itself on advising against unnecessary foreclosure 
and educating its members in compassion. Id. at 2. For more information on the NTLA, see NAT’L 
TAX LIEN ASS’N, https://ntlainfo.site-ym.com/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/VB3M-7SQ9]. 
 141 See NTLA Amicus Brief, supra note 21, at 7 (explaining that the process creates a cash flow 
for the municipality from the outstanding tax liabilities). In Massachusetts, property tax is the first and 
foremost revenue source for local municipalities. Id. at 8. In 2012, tax lien investors provided over 
$1.5 billion in capital to municipalities through the privatization procedure in the United States. Id. 
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Quincy were able to recover approximately $10 million by selling 1,300 liens 
to investors.142 
Property taxes are the primary non-federal and non-state source of reve-
nue for local towns and cities in Massachusetts.143 Proponents argue that with-
out this revenue, towns would not be able to provide libraries, recreational 
programs for children and the elderly, local government activities like planning 
and zoning, and other local services.144 Because these services benefit all resi-
dents, proponents argue that it is fair to hold taxpayers accountable.145 Delin-
quent taxes can result in budget shortfalls that leave the municipality with little 
choice but to raise taxes for the rest of the tax base or to decrease the services 
it provides.146 Privatizing delinquent taxes also eliminates the costs that munic-
ipalities incur to collect due taxes.147 Any administrative costs of pursuing the 
delinquent taxes and bringing a foreclosure action are no longer the responsi-
bility of the municipality, but rather, the private entity will take on the ex-
pense.148 Thus, privatization helps keep rates low for taxpayers who do pay 
their taxes on time.149 
Tax lien investors also dispute the assumption that every foreclosure re-
sults in a windfall.150 Private investors cite risks involved, such as fluctuating 
market conditions and long timelines for these transactions—that make the 
outcome less predictable—and the homeowner seeking bankruptcy protec-
tion.151 The National Tax Lien Association (NTLA) argues that the high inter-
                                                                                                                           
 142 Burrell, supra note 48. Worcester stated that in the fiscal years of 2010–2012, the city collect-
ed $9,796,306 from the sale of tax collector’s deeds. City of Worcester Amicus Brief, supra note 45, 
at 2. The city noted that this amount was equal to 133% of the city’s snowplow budget in 2010, the 
cost of fifty police officers in the fiscal year 2011, or fifty-two teachers in 2012. Id. 
 143 NTLA Amicus Brief, supra note 21, at 8. Municipalities use this money to provide many es-
sential services, such as education, public safety resources such as police officers and firefighters, and 
infrastructure like roads and bridges. Id. 
 144 See id. (stating that delinquent taxes can force municipalities to reduce local services); 
Shulkin, supra note 140 (describing the ability to sell liens as a “godsend” for municipalities that are 
struggling). 
 145 See Lawrence, supra note 85 (reporting that Worcester’s chief financial officer explained that 
the policy’s intent is to create a fair process to all taxpayers). 
 146 NTLA Amicus Brief, supra note 21, at 8. 
 147 See id. at 2 (describing that the cost of tax collection is borne by the lien purchaser rather than 
the municipality). 
 148 Id.; see Shulkin, supra note 140 (describing a benefit to municipalities is the ability to avoid 
the “expensive and time-consuming slog” of bringing cases to court). 
 149 See NTLA Amicus Brief, supra note 21, at 8 (explaining that this policy helps keep taxes low 
for responsible taxpayers by not leaving them to make up the difference from taxes owed by their 
neighbors). Unpaid taxes increase the tax burden on those who do pay by around $250 per year. Spen-
cer, supra note 25. 
 150 See NTLA Amicus Brief, supra note 21, at 9 (stating that there is a common belief that tax 
liens result in windfalls for investors, but that there are actually a variety of hidden risks and expenses 
associated with the practice). 
 151 Id. at 9–10. Additionally, there is no right to inspection before the purchaser takes title to the 
home, so there is a real risk that the property will require significant repair before it is suitable to be 
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est rate and the possibility of taking absolute title is necessary in order to in-
centivize lien purchasers to participate in the market and allow the municipali-
ties to obtain all of the benefits of this practice.152 
Finally, proponents of Massachusetts’ tax lien policy argue that the cur-
rent practice provides sufficient protection to property owners and prevents 
misconduct of private investors.153 The taxpayer is entitled to notice of the de-
linquent tax before any collection activities can commence, which must be 
both published and posted at least fourteen days prior to the sale.154 Additional-
ly, the tax collector deed must be recorded at the Registry of Deeds, creating 
public notice of the sale.155 Proponents claim that because of the significant 
safeguards that exist in Massachusetts, and the fact that a taxpayer in distress 
could “easily” get money to pay tax debt by borrowing against the property, it 
is unlikely that any significant equity interest will be lost.156 
On the other hand, critics, rights advocates, and some lawmakers have 
criticized the policy as predatory and unfair because it enables unconscionable 
outcomes for the sake of a profit.157 Critics point out that the industry preys on 
people who are in financial distress, are elderly, disabled, or uneducated in the 
legal system and their rights.158 Policy critics also argue that the negative con-
                                                                                                                           
sold on the market. Id. at 9. Bankruptcy foreclosures tend to be less predictable, and at the minimum 
will significantly slow the pace of the transaction for the investor, which inserts additional risk into 
the price equation. Id. at 10. 
 152 See id. at 9, 16 (asserting that granting the court the ability to give the surplus from the fore-
closure sale to the former homeowner would have a “chilling effect” on the market for tax liens). 
 153 See id. at 11–12 (arguing that protections in Massachusetts are some of the highest in the 
country, pointing particularly to notice requirements and ability of the judiciary to intervene). 
 154 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 60, §§ 16, 42 (West 2019); see also Burrell, supra note 48 (ex-
plaining that Worcester’s tax lien process requires notice to be sent twelve times to homeowners prior 
to selling the lien). 
 155 Ch. 60, § 45; see NTLA Amicus Brief, supra note 21, at 11 (arguing that such recording cre-
ates public notice). 
 156 See NTLA Amicus Brief, supra note 21, at 13 (arguing that taxes never go unpaid “for lack of 
money”). “The taxpayer could easily obtain the money through the simple expediency of borrowing 
against the property. The court can ensure that all property owners, especially pro se taxpayers, are 
given this opportunity or other means of redeeming their property.” Id. 
 157 See Kahrl, supra note 27, at 931–32 (explaining that several years ago, a group of senators 
called on the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to address these harmful policies, arguing that 
although “some state and local governments are struggling in the current economic climate . . . it is 
never acceptable to make up such a shortfall on the backs of some of our most vulnerable citizens”). 
Additionally, there is currently a bill before the Massachusetts state legislature that has not gained any 
traction in the past three years. Burrell, supra note 48. The proposed bill’s goal is to improve notifica-
tion requirements, limit fees and costs, and would divide the surplus between the homeowner and the 
municipality in the case of a tax sale. Id. 
 158 See Burrell, supra note 48 (discussing the criticism that the policy has received from lawmakers 
and consumer advocates, as well as providing examples of the impact this policy can have on taxpayers); 
Jennifer McKim, Healey Backs New Law Protecting Homeowners from Tax Lien Sales, NECIR (June 9, 
2015), https://www.necir.org/2015/06/09/healey-backs-new-law-protecting-homeowners-from-tax-lien-
sales/ [https://perma.cc/B88H-AKBV] (stating that the legislators were promoting a change to the cur-
rent law because of the current law’s risks to residents such as the elderly or disabled); Shulkin, supra 
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sequences from the privatization of the tax sale disproportionately afflicts peo-
ple who are “house rich and cash poor.”159 Because their property taxes are 
high, but home equity is an illiquid asset, these homeowners are more suscep-
tible to falling behind on tax payments and less likely to be able to catch up as 
interest compounds.160 This policy strips the former owner of their most valuable 
asset and leaves them with nothing, often for missing only a small tax bill.161 
Critics also oppose this policy because municipalities lose any ability to 
control the outcome when they accept cash for the outstanding liens, and due 
to differing incentives, municipalities tend to be more lenient than investors 
when residents face special circumstances.162 A local tax authority’s primary 
goal is to collect missing tax payments in order to benefit the community they 
serve, but they likely do not have the resources to aggressively pursue foreclo-
sure actions.163 Municipal tax collectors are part of their local governments and 
are accountable to their residents.164 These considerations are incentives 
against foreclosure and encourage municipalities to be more forgiving and 
work with the taxpayer on a payment plan.165 Investors, on the other hand, 
seek to maximize return on investment, which increases costs to the delinquent 
                                                                                                                           
note 140 (describing the tax lien process’s benefits and harms, including the critique from State Rep. 
John J. Mahoney that current safeguards may not be adequate for people who cannot understand the 
“legalese”). 
 159 Shulkin, supra note 140. 
 160 See Andrea Riquier, America Is House-Rich but Cash-Poor—and These Businesses See Oppor-
tunity, MARKETWATCH (June 16, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/america-is-house-rich-but-
cash-poor-these-businesses-see-opportunity-2018-06-08/print [https://perma.cc/V3DV-RVG2] (describ-
ing equity in a home as “worthless” because of its illiquidity when the homeowner needs money for 
expenses such as medical bills or home improvements). This is particularly challenging for a person 
who inherited the home or has paid off the mortgage and owns all of the equity, but does not have 
wealth in the form of cash in order to pay their taxes. See, e.g., Burrell, supra note 70 (describing the 
case of Michelle Cook, a recently unemployed woman with two daughters, whose Worcester home 
had been in her family for decades). 
 161 See McFarlane, supra note 19 (stating that because of this policy some homeowners are “one 
tax bill away from being homeless”); see, e.g., Sallah, supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 162 See McKim, supra note 69 (stating that private investors have different incentives from mu-
nicipalities); Shulkin, supra note 140 (stating that after selling tax liens to private parties, municipali-
ties forego the ability to assist people in need). Investors essentially step into the role of the municipal 
tax collector and local governments lose all influence over enforcement. See Lawrence, supra note 85 
(stating that the investor will step into the shoes of the town by bringing the cases in court and pro-
cessing the tax debts). 
 163 See Spencer, supra note 25 (stating that the town uses taxpayer money to meet its obligations 
to its residents and that towns do not typically have the financial or labor resources to aggressively 
pursue foreclosure actions). 
 164 Tallage LLC v. Meaney, 23 LCR 375, 377 (Mass. Land Ct. 2015) (stating that the tax collec-
tion was previously conducted within the political process, similar to the District Attorney’s office). 
 165 See id. (describing the tax foreclosure process as controlled by the political process when 
carried out by the municipality, done with a measure of discretion and awareness of special circum-
stances). 
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taxpayer and the rate of foreclosure.166 First, investors are incentivized not to 
notify the property owner of delinquencies and pending foreclosures because 
the longer that taxes are delinquent, the higher the investor’s profit due to rap-
idly compounding interest.167 Additionally, because an investor keeps all sur-
plus from a tax sale, investors are motivated to make it as difficult as possible 
for taxpayers to redeem before foreclosure.168 This can be done by charging 
expenses and fees to make the redemption amount prohibitively high, provid-
ing limited notice, and refusing to be lenient.169 Additionally, investment 
groups may have the resources to aggressively pursue foreclosure actions and 
sell the home on the market.170 Investors are also not beholden to any political 
process and have no obligation to act in the best interests of the community.171 
Because of these differing considerations, the privatization of delinquent prop-
erty tax liens inflicts substantially greater harm than municipal enforcement.172 
Finally, critics point out that the privatization of tax lien foreclosures take 
more from the taxpayer than just their home—it takes away their dignity.173 
Taxpayers who fall behind on payments are disproportionately poor, elderly, or 
                                                                                                                           
 166 See Joshua J. Miller & Silda Nikaj, The Response of Delinquent Taxpayers to More Aggres-
sive Collection, 69 NAT’L TAX J. 77, 81 (2016) (finding that privatization of tax liens increases the 
number of foreclosures). In one Ohio county, tax foreclosures were rare, but after the county sold its 
tax liens, 100 tax foreclosures were filed in two days. Id. Private tax foreclosures are also more expen-
sive for the property owner because private investors can pass on expenses and costs such as the in-
vestor’s attorney fees. Id. at 80. 
 167 See Burrell, supra note 48 (describing one of investment companies’ key strategies as keeping 
homeowners “in the dark,” and using fear and confusion to prevent homeowners from redeeming). 
 168 See Tallage, 23 LCR at 377 n.10 (explaining that investors have no incentive to compromise 
with the homeowner to reduce either the interest or principal to enable the homeowner to pay off the 
bill, and they are also incentivized to attempt to acquire the property itself through foreclosure); Bur-
rell, supra note 70 (stating that this policy encourages local governments to “stack the odds” against 
delinquent taxpayers). Anticipation of higher returns is evidenced by the investors’ willingness to pay 
premiums over the principal, which is the amount owed. Tallage, 23 LCR at 377 n.10. Additionally, 
the Land Court reports that some private investors outright refuse to enter into any voluntary payment 
plan, which forces the property owner to go to court and make the request. Id. 
 169 See Burrell, supra note 70 (stating that the amount required to redeem grows rapidly due to 
interest, costs, and fees, making foreclosure more likely); see, e.g., Tallage, 23 LCR at 375, 382 (not-
ing that the investor demanded $30,612.24 for redemption for principal, costs and fees, including 
$25,582.50 of attorney’s fees, for missing water and sewer bills totaling $492.51). 
 170 See, e.g., Burrell, supra note 48 (describing the investment company Tallage LLC, which is 
one of the largest tax lien buyers in the state). Tallage’s website states that it is run by a real estate 
investor, has general counsel, and a firm principal to oversee transactions. Firm Profile, TALLAGE, 
www.tallagellc.com/firm.html [https://perma.cc/7SMN-94QJ]; Key Personnel, TALLAGE, www.
tallagellc.com/staff.html [https://perma.cc/4F44-JYET]. 
 171 See Tallage, 23 LCR at 377 (stating that investment companies are not beholden to residents 
of municipalities, but rather to their investors). 
 172 See Miller & Nikaj, supra note 166, at 80–81 (stating that privatization of tax liens increases 
the number of foreclosures and is more costly for the property owner, thus causing more damage 
overall). 
 173 See generally Kahrl, supra note 27 (characterizing tax takings through the foreclosure process 
as dignity takings). 
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do not understand the law and the ramifications of such actions.174 People who 
have fallen behind in tax payments, whether due to personal, financial, or other 
reasons, often feel profoundly ashamed and humiliated at the prospect of being 
unable to manage their finances.175 People who cannot pay taxes are ostracized 
and blamed for their predicament, often characterized as “dumb and dim-witted” 
for losing their homes to tax foreclosure.176 Tax buyers are aware of this emo-
tional burden and use it as leverage against homeowners.177 Ashamed and dis-
tressed, unaware of the brutal consequences, and confused by the opaque legal 
maze, people are unlikely to seek critical legal assistance.178 Eviction and po-
tential loss of their most valuable possession is devastating, particularly if the 
person is already facing poverty or personal issues that contributed to the cir-
cumstances.179 Furthermore, the “remedy” designed to prevent this type of 
abuse actually requires the victims to plead their own incompetence.180 To seek 
relief, delinquent taxpayers must beg the court to declare that they are incapa-
ble of handling their own financial affairs.181 This policy degrades the delin-
quent taxpayer, stripping them of their dignity in order to save their home from 
foreclosure.182 
                                                                                                                           
 174 Sallah et al., supra note 1. A judge in Michigan explained that delinquent taxpayers are typi-
cally not educated about the law and are not sophisticated parties, so they tend not to understand their 
rights. Kahrl, supra note 27, at 915. This allows for windfalls for more sophisticated tax buyers, who 
are aware of the knowledge disparity and are willing to exploit it. Id. 
 175 Kahrl, supra note 27, at 907. The shame is typically due to the embarrassment of being unable 
to pay taxes or other particular circumstances that prevented them from doing so. Id. 
 176 See id. at 916 (quoting Chicago attorney Robert Cushman testifying before the Illinois General 
Assembly in 1969). 
 177 Id. at 907. In the 1970s, a study in South Carolina found that significantly more fraudulent tax 
lien foreclosures occur than are reported and attributed this disparity to the shame that victims feel. Id. 
at 915. 
 178 Id. at 933; see McKim, supra note 69 (stating that a nonprofit legal services group has noticed 
that many of the individuals are low income and elderly, and have no awareness that they could lose 
their home). 
 179 See Kahrl, supra note 27, at 922. The author provides the example of eighty-three-year-old 
Veronica Micetich, an immigrant widow who relied on her recently deceased husband to handle the 
financial affairs and taxes and was evicted from her home for failing to pay taxes. The neighbors re-
ported that she stood in the yard, yelling “save my house.” Id. 
 180 See id. at 907 (stating that victims have little choice but to beg for pity in front of the court and 
argue that they are incompetent to handle their own financial affairs). After a judgment of foreclosure 
has been entered, the former owner may bring an action to vacate the judgment within one year under 
ch. 60, § 69A “after careful consideration and in instances where it is required to accomplish justice.” 
Ch. 60, § 69A; Tallage, 23 LCR at 377. 
 181 Kahrl, supra note 27, at 919 (explaining that victims are forced to portray themselves as “ig-
norant, impoverished, and worthy of pity” in order to persuade the court to grant relief). 
 182 See id. (describing the doctrine of equity as a “Hail Mary” attempt in which the former owner 
must beg the court for relief, and the toll that this takes on a person). 
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B. Failing to Return the Excess Proceeds to the Former  
Homeowner May Be an Unconstitutional Taking 
Massachusetts’ tax lien foreclosure policy has also been criticized for be-
ing both inequitable and unconstitutional because the former owner does not 
receive surplus proceeds from the tax foreclosure sale.183 The Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts has declared that, per the current tax foreclosure stat-
ute, the foreclosing party has no duty to give the surplus proceeds from the tax 
sale to the former homeowner.184 The court reasoned that the legislature’s in-
tent in drafting the statute was clear—the surplus from a sale of property due 
to delinquent taxes is owned by the municipality.185 Critics argue that this is an 
unconstitutional taking in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment of the U.S. Constitution that: “private property [shall not] be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.”186 
The Supreme Court first addressed Takings Clause implications of the 
surplus from tax sales in 1881 in United States v. Taylor, when it interpreted a 
Congressional statute as requiring surplus to be paid to the former owner.187 
Three years later, in United States v. Lawton, the Court declared it would be an 
unconstitutional taking to refuse to compensate a former homeowner for the 
surplus proceeds under the same statute.188 In 1956, the Supreme Court revisit-
                                                                                                                           
 183 See generally Clifford, supra note 18 (arguing that the Massachusetts tax deed sale is an un-
constitutional taking). 
 184 See Kelly v. City of Boston, 204 N.E.2d 123, 125 (Mass. 1965) (holding that the surplus pro-
ceeds from sale of the property belong to the tax lien purchaser). 
 185 See id. (analyzing the legislature’s 1941 amendment of ch. 60, § 79, which changed the treat-
ment of the surplus of lands of low value that had been taken by the municipality without a foreclo-
sure, and finding that the legislature added the requirement that the surplus funds be left with the mu-
nicipality treasurer to be available to be paid to the former owner if requested within five years). The 
court found it indicative of legislative intent that they did not create a similar provision for cases 
where the right of redemption had been judicially foreclosed. Id. 
 186 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Clifford, supra note 18, at 291–92 (asserting that the privatization 
of delinquent tax liens is an unconstitutional taking). 
 187 104 U.S. 216, 218 (1881); see Clifford, supra note 18, at 284 (stating that this was the first 
case in which the Supreme Court explicitly discussed keeping excess proceeds from a tax foreclosure 
sale). The statute in question stated that any proceeds resulting from the sale of a property with delin-
quent taxes must be held by the U.S. Treasury until the former owner applied to receive such pro-
ceeds. Taylor, 104 U.S. at 218. The plaintiff brought suit under this statute to recover surplus proceeds 
from a tax sale. Id. at 216. The original landowner failed to pay a $37 tax and the land was sold to a 
third party for $3,000 in 1865. Id. at 216–17. The United States was entitled to $70.50 after the tax, 
costs, and expenses of the sale. Id. at 217. In 1874, the ultimate beneficiary of the former owner’s 
property interest applied to the Secretary of the Treasury for the surplus. Id. The Court found that the 
statute clearly requires the government to return the surplus, as long as the statute had not been over-
turned by subsequent legislation. Id. at 218. The Court held that it had not and, therefore, the surplus 
rightfully belonged to the plaintiff. Id. at 219. 
 188 110 U.S. 146, 150 (1884). In Lawton, land was bought by the United States in 1863 for $1,100 
due to $88 in delinquent taxes. Id. at 148. The owner did not make an application to recover this sur-
plus, so the government paid nothing. Id. The beneficiaries of the original owner sought to recover the 
surplus, but the Secretary of the Treasury denied their application. Id. The Court held that to “with-
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ed the topic in the case of Nelson v. City of New York.189 Unlike the prior two 
cases, the Supreme Court decided that the defendant’s refusal to pay the sur-
plus from a tax sale to the former owner was not an unconstitutional taking.190 
The Court differentiated this case on the basis that the New York statute in 
Nelson provided avenues to recover the surplus and did not explicitly mandate 
that surplus from tax sales be given to the owner.191 
Lawton and Nelson create two distinct rules regarding the constitutionality 
of the treatment of surplus proceeds from tax lien sales.192 Lawton established 
that refusing to return surplus equity from a property in which the former home-
owner has a statutory interest will give rise to a Takings Clause claim.193 Nelson 
established that if a statute provides ways for the former homeowner to recover 
the surplus equity, but the homeowner fails to utilize these avenues in a timely 
manner, later refusal to give surplus equity to the former homeowner will not 
raise a Takings Clause claim.194 
Recently, the tax lien foreclosure policy came to national attention as a re-
sult of the Washington Post’s investigative work in Washington, D.C.—Bennie 
Coleman’s story and his case Coleman v. District of Columbia.195 In 2014, 
Coleman argued it was an unconstitutional taking for a third-party investment 
                                                                                                                           
hold the surplus from the owner would be to violate the fifth amendment to the constitution, and de-
prive him of his property without due process of law or take his property for public use without just 
compensation.” Id. at 150. The Court stated that this money was set aside as belonging to the former 
owner, the same as if a third person or the government had purchased the property. Id. 
 189 352 U.S. 103, 103 (1956). 
 190 See id. at 106, 110 (allowing the city to keep all profits from a foreclosure sale of a property 
due to four years of unpaid taxes although the sale of the property generated revenue that far exceeded 
the amount due). 
 191 Id. at 110. The statute requires notice to the property owner, and then if seven weeks pass, a 
judgement of foreclosure may be entered, and the person will lose all right to redemption, title, inter-
est, and equity in the property. Id. at 105. The statute provides that the deed is executed in fee simple 
absolute to the city, and the city may keep the property to sell it and retain all proceeds. Id. 
 192 See id. at 110 (finding no unconstitutional taking because the statute provided a remedy for the 
taxpayer to recover surplus proceeds from a tax sale); Lawton, 110 U.S. at 150 (finding an unconstitu-
tional taking because the statute required surplus proceeds to be returned to the former owner). 
 193 See Lawton, 110 U.S. at 150 (stating “[t]o withhold the surplus from the owner would be to 
violate the fifth amendment to the constitution, and deprive him of his property without due process of 
law or take his property for public use without just compensation”). 
 194 See Nelson, 352 U.S. at 110 (deciding that the statute at issue is not unconstitutional because it 
does not “absolutely preclude[] an owner from obtaining the surplus proceeds of a judicial sale”). If 
the homeowner proved that the value of the property “substantially exceeded” the tax amount due, 
then a separate sale would be held so that the owner could receive the surplus. Id. The Court explains 
that the City of New York gives ample opportunity for the owner to recover the surplus, but if they do 
not do so in a timely manner, the City may retain the proceeds. Id. 
 195 Coleman ex rel. Bunn v. District of Columbia, 70 F. Supp. 3d 58 (D.D.C. 2014); see Sallah et 
al., supra note 1 (reporting on the effects of tax foreclosures in the District of Columbia, including the 
details of Bennie Coleman’s story). 
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company to keep the surplus from the tax sale of his property.196 D.C.’s tax 
lien foreclosure process extinguished the former owner’s equity interest in the 
property upon tax foreclosure and allowed the foreclosing party to retain all 
surplus proceeds.197 
The district court determined that Nelson did not bar Mr. Coleman’s claim 
because the D.C. statute does not provide an avenue in which a taxpayer can 
recover the surplus from a property tax sale.198 Mr. Coleman’s claim therefore 
raises an issue that the Court has not previously addressed.199 Although the 
case settled before reaching a judgment, it opened the door to meaningful liti-
gation regarding whether this policy amounts to an unconstitutional taking.200 
Massachusetts’s tax lien policy’s critics argue that here, as in Coleman, a 
valid Takings Clause claim exists, whether under the Fifth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution or under the state constitution equivalent.201 The Massachu-
setts statute provides no remedy for recovery of surplus, and homeowners have 
a valid property interest in the surplus equity, which meets the requirements 
discussed by the court in Coleman.202 Additionally, the Massachusetts constitu-
tion mandates taxation equality and it is a violation of Massachusetts due pro-
                                                                                                                           
 196 Coleman, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 63. The District of Columbia moved to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. The court ultimately held that the takings claim was 
sufficiently alleged to survive the motion to dismiss. Id. In 2015, the court allowed Coleman’s case to 
proceed as a class action. Coleman ex rel. Bunn v. District of Columbia, 306 F.R.D. 68, 68–88 
(D.D.C. 2015) (certifying Coleman’s case as a class action). The case was later settled out of court. 
Hsu, supra note 6. In January 2017, the District agreed to pay up to 65% of a property’s assessed 
value to the aggrieved taxpayer or the estate. Id. The Washington Post estimates that the District will 
ultimately pay out approximately $1 million. Id. 
 197 Coleman, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 62. In the District of Columbia, after the municipality sells the tax 
lien to a third party, a six-month period must pass before the purchaser may take action in the trial 
court to foreclose. Id. at 64. Before the six months have elapsed, the taxpayer may redeem by paying 
the taxes owed plus any penalties, interest, and costs. Id. at 63. The court can then enter a judgment 
granting the property title in fee simple to the lien purchaser. Id. at 64. 
 198 Id. at 80. 
 199 See id. (stating that Coleman’s case raised a question not previously addressed: “What if the 
tax-sale statute does not provide a right to the surplus and the statute provides no avenue for recovery 
of any surplus?”). 
 200 See Hsu, supra note 6 (stating that legal analysts believed that the settlement prior to trial left 
open some unsolved legal issues). The district court determined that in order to win his case, Mr. 
Coleman had to prove that the remaining elements of a Takings Clause claim are met: that he had a 
property interest in the surplus equity, the property was taken, he was not provided compensation, and 
the taking was not for a public purpose. Coleman, 70 F.3d at 81. 
 201 See 70 F. Supp. 3d at 81 (finding that the plaintiff had shown enough to raise a possible Tak-
ings Clause claim); Clifford, supra note 18, at 291–92 (arguing that the Massachusetts tax deed fore-
closure process is a violation of both the United States Constitution and the Massachusetts Constitu-
tion). The federal constitution acts as the “floor” for state constitutional rights, thus the Massachusetts 
Constitution must provide either equal or greater protection to its citizens. Clifford, supra note 18, at 
292. 
 202 Clifford, supra note 18, at 287. Clifford argues that, per Coleman’s logic, because a delinquent 
taxpayer has full ownership interest in his property before the tax deed is recorded, Lawton prohibits 
eliminating that interest. Id. 
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cess to impose on one person a greater or lower tax burden than others.203 By 
eliminating a taxpayer’s equity interest in his home for failing to pay property 
taxes, this policy requires the delinquent taxpayer whose home is foreclosed to 
pay many multiples of his original tax debt, more than what others pay.204 
On the other hand, proponents of the policy argue that the practice is con-
stitutional and has been recognized as such by the courts.205 In 1969, the Unit-
ed States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that a statute 
allowing private entities to purchase tax deeds and retain all surplus from tax 
sales was constitutional.206 The court reasoned that the statutory two-year re-
demption period sufficiently provided the taxpayer with a remedy—they could 
sell the property within the time frame to pay off the debt and keep the re-
mainder.207 
III. THE MASSACHUSETTS LEGISLATURE SHOULD ELIMINATE OR MODIFY 
THE PRIVATIZATION OF DELINQUENT PROPERTY TAX LIENS 
As it is currently written and practiced, Massachusetts’ privatization of 
delinquent property tax liens is poor public policy with unconstitutional re-
sults.208 First, this policy is unacceptable because it creates improper incentives 
for investors to prey on unsophisticated litigants, which creates disproportion-
ately unjust outcomes for the most vulnerable members of society.209 Addition-
ally, the policy may be unconstitutional because the statute allows private in-
vestors to take the equity that rightfully belongs to the homeowner without just 
compensation.210 Finally, there are a variety of large and small-scale steps the 
Commonwealth can take to improve outcomes for both its residents and mu-
nicipalities.211 
The policy is unsound because it creates detrimental and unfair outcomes 
that thoroughly outweigh any benefit to investors and municipalities.212 Propo-
                                                                                                                           
 203 See In re Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.E.2d 795, 800 (Mass. 1995) (interpreting the Massa-
chusetts Constitution to forbid requiring some taxpayers to pay more or less than others). 
 204 Clifford, supra note 18, at 292. Based on the records that Clifford collected and analyzed, he 
determined that the delinquent taxpayer pays on average sixty-two times more than his original taxes 
owed when his equity stake is foreclosed. Id. 
 205 See NTLA Amicus Brief, supra note 21, at 4–5 (noting that the Supreme Court has declined to 
find the practice unconstitutional). 
 206 Balthazar v. Mari LTD, 301 F. Supp. 103, 106 (N.D. Ill. 1969). 
 207 See id. (suggesting that the delinquent taxpayer could convey the property to a purchaser, 
subject to the outstanding certificate, which would allow the owner to keep the surplus value). 
 208 See infra notes 212–257 and accompanying text. 
 209 See infra notes 212–232 and accompanying text. 
 210 See infra notes 233–238 and accompanying text. 
 211 See infra notes 239–257 and accompanying text. 
 212 See, e.g., Tallage LLC v. Meaney, 23 LCR 375, 375–81 (Mass. Land Ct. 2015) (noting that a 
family facing numerous health crises was exceptionally vulnerable and is not the type of intentional 
2020] The Privatization of Delinquent Property Tax Liens 695 
nents of the policy celebrate its ability to generate revenue for local municipal-
ities and ensure compliance with tax obligations, but municipalities are not 
entitled to the property of a citizen above and beyond their tax obligation.213 
Studies have shown that this policy has resulted in towns collecting dozens of 
multiples over the amount that they were owed.214 Although this money may 
be put towards public use, it cannot be ignored that it was sourced by imposing 
significant hardship on already financially distressed homeowners.215 The li-
quidity benefit does not justify enabling investors to force a person onto the 
street, stripped of all equity in their most valuable asset.216 
Additionally, because municipalities and investors are driven by distinct 
incentives, allowing private investors to pursue delinquent property tax liens 
exacerbates the devastating effects of this policy.217 Investors are more incen-
tivized to foreclose than municipalities, thereby furthering the likelihood of 
this outcome when given the authority to do so.218 Investors can drive redemp-
tion costs prohibitively high and are less inclined than municipalities to be 
cognizant of special circumstances, making it more difficult for taxpayers to 
recover their homes.219 Interest accrues at a rate that is nearly impossible to 
find in alternative forms of investment, and tax buyers have a seemingly un-
                                                                                                                           
tax delinquents that the statute is designed to catch); Burrell, supra note 48 (providing examples of 
how the policy has negatively affected some Massachusetts taxpayers). 
 213 See Tallage, 23 LCR at 381–82 (stating that the only valid interest a town has in a tax foreclo-
sure is to collect the taxes and costs that are due); Spencer, supra note 25 (discussing the benefits of 
this policy, including encouraging delinquent taxpayers to satisfy their debts and allowing municipali-
ties to generate revenue quickly). 
 214 See Clifford, supra note 18, at 282–83 (finding that municipalities in Massachusetts collected 
42.87 times more than they were owed in delinquent taxes through this policy). 
 215 Compare Spencer, supra note 25 (listing the public benefits that municipalities provide with 
tax funding), with Tallage, 23 LCR at 379 (describing the health crises that a local family faced that 
caused them to fall behind on one sewer and water bill and the significant financial and emotional 
hardship they endured adjudicating their case, costing them thousands of dollars and immeasurable 
stress). 
 216 See Burrell, supra note 48 (reporting that an attorney had seen cases where a person had owned 
$100,00–$200,000 worth of equity in their home and it was all lost to the purchaser, describing it as 
“outrageous”); Spencer, supra note 25 (applauding the benefit of an infusion of cash for municipalities). 
 217 See Miller & Nikaj, supra note 166, at 80–81 (stating that privatization of tax liens increases 
the number of foreclosures); McKim, supra note 69 (stating that private investors have different in-
centives from municipalities). 
 218 Tallage, 23 LCR at 377 n.10 (suggesting that investors are not incentivized to help with the 
homeowner to pay off the bill, but rather, they are incentivized to keep rates high and attempt to take 
the property through foreclosure); Miller & Nikaj, supra note 166, at 80–81 (stating that privatization 
of tax liens increases the number of foreclosures). 
 219 See Tallage, 23 LCR at 377 (stating that municipalities are more likely to take special circum-
stances into account, while private investors are incentivized to be less sympathetic); Burrell, supra 
note 70 (stating that this policy encourages local governments to “stack the odds” against delinquent 
taxpayers). 
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limited ability to tack on fees to inflate redemption costs.220 Also, privatization 
removes the tax lien foreclosure process from accountability to constituents.221 
A government entity enforcing these tax liens is answerable to the public, but 
private entities are beholden only to their investors with the goal of maximiz-
ing profit.222 Despite the argument that privatization is beneficial because it 
increases taxpayer compliance, research has shown that, after a taxpayer 
reaches a certain level of financial hardship, privatization serves no means of 
deterrent.223 If a taxpayer, like Bennie Coleman, has dementia and does not 
understand he owes taxes, a stricter enforcement regime will not be more ef-
fective—it will only be more punitive.224 It does not make sense to harshly 
punish people facing already staggering hardship, and it is unacceptable to al-
low this policy to persist when we are aware of the harm it can inflict.225 
Additionally, this policy tends to pit sophisticated parties, such as inves-
tors or cities, against individuals who are almost exclusively unrepresented.226 
                                                                                                                           
 220 See RAO, supra note 10, at 4 (explaining that interest rates in banks are less than 1%); Burrell 
supra note 70 (describing Colin Roache’s situation, in which a seventy-eight-year-old man was 
$2,768 behind on taxes, and the investment company that purchased the lien demanded over $22,000 
for taxes, interest accrued, and fees). In 2018, Stage One Investors, a company that buys and enforces 
delinquent real estate tax liens in Massachusetts, was ordered to pay $125,000 in restitution to 100 
property owners due to claims that the company collected excessive fees from people seeking to re-
deem. George Barnes, Stage One Investors of Worcester to Repay Fees to 100 Homeowners in Settle-
ment of Tax Lien Case, TELEGRAM.COM (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.telegram.com/news/20180424/
stage-one-investors-of-worcester-to-repay-fees-to-100-homeowners-in-settlement-of-tax-lien-case 
[https://perma.cc/AL77-VHGW]. 
 221 See Tallage, 23 LCR at 377 (explaining that municipal tax collectors operate within the politi-
cal process and private investors do not). 
 222 See id. (stating that municipal tax collectors, like a District Attorney, are part of local politics); 
Morgan Brennan, Vulture Investing: What You Need to Know Before Bidding for Tax Liens, FORBES 
(Dec. 10, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/morganbrennan/2012/11/26/vulture-investing-what-
you-need-to-know-before-bidding-for-tax-liens [https://perma.cc/X5YB-KMDR] (providing tax lien 
investment advice including the suggestion that to foreclose property, one needs the “stomach to put 
Grandma out on the street”). 
 223 See Miller & Nikaj, supra note 166, at 98 (finding that in poor housing markets, taxpayers are 
no more likely to pay their taxes when enforced more strictly); Spencer, supra note 25 (stating that the 
investment firm Tallage reported that 40% of tax liens were redeemed prior to auction). 
 224 See Sallah et al., supra note 1 (describing the case of Bennie Coleman, an elderly veteran who 
had lived in his home his entire life, but suffered from dementia and missed a $134 tax bill, which 
ultimately led to the foreclosure of his home and eviction). As Coleman’s dementia progressed, he 
would sometimes forget to pay bills or buy groceries, so neighbors would bring him plates of food. Id. 
 225 See Tallage, 23 LCR at 375–81 (describing the case brought by the Meaney family to redeem 
their home that had been lost to private buyer through a tax foreclosure sale due to small unpaid utility 
bills that were missed during the family’s numerous health crises experienced at the time); Sallah et 
al., supra note 1 (detailing the case of Bennie Coleman, a retired marine sergeant who suffered from 
dementia and lost his home to a private investor through the tax foreclosure process due to a $134 
property tax bill). 
 226 Amanda Zuretti, Tallage Adams, LLC et al.—Massachusetts Land Court Case. No. 10 TL 
141227, 20 MASS. BAR ASS’N LAW. J., Mar. 2013, at 20, 22, https://massbar.org/docs/default-source/
publications-document-library/lawyers-journal/2013/march/march2013-.pdf?Status=Master&sfvrsn=
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Homeowners who have missed a tax payment due to failing health or a finan-
cial crisis are forced to either pay excessive redemption costs or pursue this 
issue in court.227 If they cannot afford the initial tax, the snowballing accumu-
lation of interest and fees will almost certainly be prohibitively high. 228 In or-
der to dispute the tax lien foreclosure proceedings in court, homeowners may 
be forced to either pay unaffordable legal fees or proceed on their own, often 
without the resources—due to the same health issues or family crises that 
caused them to fall behind on taxes—to educate themselves on the law and 
argue on their own behalf in court.229 Homeowners are often completely una-
ware of the ramifications that result from failure to pay property taxes.230 
These individuals are unlikely to be educated in the meaning of legal terms 
like right of redemption or how to defend their rights.231 The system is com-
plex, confusing, and can be impossible to navigate for someone who is unfa-
miliar with the legal system.232 
In addition to being poor policy, failure of a municipality or a private enti-
ty to return the surplus proceeds from a tax foreclosure sale may be an uncon-
stitutional taking because the Massachusetts statute does not provide the for-
mer homeowner with any avenue to recover the excess proceeds.233 The court 
                                                                                                                           
fcba01b6_2 [https://perma.cc/Z82Q-S3ED] (stating that the Land Court Judge adjudicating a tax lien 
foreclosure case commented that “nearly all of the taxpayers were pro se litigants”). 
 227 See Sallah et al., supra note 1 (describing a case in which an elderly man and his son could not 
afford to pay the $4,999 demanded by the investment company in order to redeem his home, and dis-
cussing how attorney’s fees can be as high as $450 an hour, making it highly unlikely that he could 
afford legal costs). 
 228 See Burrell, supra note 48 (stating that the Meaneys started out with $492.51 of missed utility 
bills, but paid $4,600 to redeem, plus tens of thousands of dollars in legal fees to their own lawyer for 
litigating their case). 
 229 MASS. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT ON ACTIVITIES 3 (2019), http://www.
massa2j.org/a2j/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Access-to-Justice-Commission-Annual-Report-Aug.-
2019-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4BT-KM8M] (stating that, due to insufficient funding, legal aid 
organizations are unable to help 65% of eligible people who need legal assistance); see Kahrl, supra 
note 27, at 915, 933 (quoting a circuit court judge in Michigan who explained that most delinquent 
taxpayers are not sophisticated actors and describing the process as a confusing, opaque maze de-
signed to be difficult to navigate). 
 230 See McKim, supra note 69 (describing the experience of an attorney for a nonprofit group in 
Lawrence that provides free legal services to low income and elderly residents). She reported that she 
noticed an increasing number of clients asking for help regarding tax lien foreclosures and they had no 
idea that they could lose their home. Id. She stated that they are shocked to hear what may happen to 
their homes. Id. 
 231 See Shulkin, supra note 140 (discussing that, although some precautions are in place, he is 
worried about people who are not able to understand the legal language). 
 232 See Kahrl, supra note 27, at 906 (describing the investors’ actions towards delinquent taxpay-
ers when providing notice of proceedings as deliberately confusing and overwhelming). Kahrl argues 
that lienholders often leverage their knowledge to intimidate the taxpayers and make them believe that 
the full weight of government power is on the lienholder’s side in order to prevent them from seeking 
legal advice or questioning what rights they may have. Id. at 906–07. 
 233 See Coleman ex rel. Bunn v. District of Columbia, 70 F. Supp. 3d 58, 81 (D.D.C. 2014) (inter-
preting the holdings of Nelson and Lawton as leaving open the possibility of a Takings Clause viola-
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in Coleman v. District of Columbia found that United States v. Lawton and 
Nelson v. City of New York left this question open, and because the government 
takes individuals’ equity without just compensation, this process violates the 
Takings Clause.234 Investors tend to pursue tax liens more aggressively than 
government entities, thus increasing rates of property loss and constitutional 
infringement.235 
Additionally, the Massachusetts Constitution mandates taxation equality, 
and requiring delinquent taxpayers whose homes have been foreclosed to pay 
many multiples of the taxes due is not only unfair, it is unconstitutional.236 
Government benefit does not justify unconstitutionally stripping a person, es-
pecially those suffering from dire circumstances, of their most valuable as-
set.237 Municipal services are designed to benefit the community, so it does not 
make sense to allow governments to disproportionately fund these same ser-
vices off the backs of their residents most in need of assistance.238 
In other states, victims have brought cases to challenge the statutes that 
allow the lienholder to retain all surplus from a tax foreclosure sale.239 In Mas-
sachusetts, because property tax enforcement and sales are conducted inde-
pendently at the municipal level, it would be difficult to aggregate the societal 
effects into one claim like the class action brought by Coleman.240 Courts have 
repeatedly recognized the harshness of this policy, but acknowledge that they 
are bound to enforce the law as written and call on the legislature to enact 
change.241 Aggrieved citizens alternatively have the option to invoke the notion 
                                                                                                                           
tion when a statute does not provide a method to recover surplus proceeds); Clifford, supra note 18, at 
289, 291 (arguing that tax deed sales are unconstitutional, per Coleman’s conclusion that Lawton is 
still viable and the rest of the elements of a Takings Clause claim are met). 
 234 See Coleman, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 81 (holding that because Lawton and Nelson do not contradict 
one another, the plaintiff raised a valid Takings Clause claim and needed to prove the remaining ele-
ments). 
 235 See Burrell, supra note 70 (stating that privatization increases likelihood of tax foreclosure). 
 236 See Clifford, supra note 18, at 292–93 (discussing the taxation equality requirement of the 
Massachusetts Constitution, and finding that a delinquent taxpayer who is forced to pay the entire 
equity of their home grossly overpays their share of taxes as a result of this policy). 
 237 See Burrell, supra note 70 (providing the story of Pauline Desrosiers, who missed paying a 
$400 water bill during a severe bout of pancreatitis, thought she paid off the bill, but later found out 
that Stage One Investors had purchased the tax lien and demanded $25,000 to redeem the home in 
which she lived with her two adult daughters with cerebral palsy). 
 238 See Spencer, supra note 25 (stating that municipal budgets are used for providing services like 
public works and education). 
 239 See, e.g., Coleman, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 58 (challenging the tax lien foreclosure policy in the 
District of Columbia). 
 240 See Coleman ex rel. Bunn v. District of Columbia, 306 F.R.D. 68 (D.D.C. 2015) (certifying 
Coleman’s case as a class action). 
 241 See Kahrl, supra note 27, at 917 (explaining that tax buyers know that courts generally find 
predatory tax buying unconscionable, so they are careful to follow procedure exactly because courts 
would void the tax deed at the slightest procedural error). See, e.g., Balthazar v. Mari Ltd., 301 F. 
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of equity and beg the court to sympathize with their case in the name of jus-
tice.242 Although this avenue can be effective, it is not a viable large scale solu-
tion because these cases are highly fact specific and the outcomes are depend-
ent on the judge.243 
Neighboring states, such as Rhode Island, have successfully implemented 
legislative reform.244 In Massachusetts, legislators have proposed changes, but 
progress has stalled in the past several years, likely in part because wealthy 
investors are able to spend significant amounts of money on lobbyists to influ-
ence legislators and protect their interests.245 Unfortunately, the people most 
often victimized by this policy are unlikely to have financial or political lever-
age to advocate for change on a similar level.246 Proponents of this policy ar-
gue that there is no crisis and the effects of this policy are minimal; however, if 
even one family is evicted and stripped of all their equity, the policy has in-
flicted too much harm.247 Homes are often the most important asset that people 
have—they are bound up with lifetimes of memories, making their intrinsic 
value priceless.248 The privatization of delinquent property tax liens allows 
wealthy and powerful investors to utilize fear tactics, intimidation, and shame 
to strong-arm the most vulnerable members of society into forfeiting their equity 
stake.249 A policy that has been proved to cripple underserved communities and 
                                                                                                                           
Supp. 103, 105 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (stating, “[o]ppressive statutes must be tempered by the legislature, 
not the court”). 
 242 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 60, § 69A (West 2019) (granting the court authority to vacate 
a decree of foreclosure); Kahrl, supra note 27, at 919 (describing the doctrine of equity as a “Hail 
Mary” that forces taxpayers to beg their own incapacity). 
 243 See Kahrl, supra note 27, at 919 (stating that these cases hinge on the judge’s sympathy and 
are unpredictable). They establish no rule for others to follow and, although these types of decisions 
can change the lives of those affected, it will not fix the underlying problem. Id. at 920. 
 244 See Dunn, supra note 119 (describing the Madeline Walker Act and the positive impact the 
new legislation has had on vulnerable homeowners in Rhode Island). 
 245 See Burrell, supra note 48 (stating that Tallage alone has spent $46,000 lobbying the Massa-
chusetts legislature to prevent reform); see also Kahrl, supra note 27, at 933 (stating that tax lien in-
vestors are often closely linked with members of local governments and quickly respond to negative 
press regarding the tax lien industry). 
 246 See Burrell, supra note 48 (quoting a Quincy resident, Madeline Lahssak, who risks losing her 
home to this policy). She describes herself as poor, stating that she relies on subsidized housing in 
order to pay rent. Id. 
 247 See McKim, supra note 69 (quoting Tallage LLC’s lawyer defending the policy and saying 
that there is no tax title foreclosure crisis). Brad Westover, the executive director of the NTLA, de-
fended the industry, stating that it “shouldn’t be hindered because a ‘small percentage of homeowners’ 
lose their homes.” Id. 
 248 See Burrell, supra note 70 (interviewing Michelle Cook, a Worcester resident, who lost a 
home that had been in her family for three generations after she was laid off and became unable to pay 
a tax bill). She inherited the home and raised her two daughters there. Id. She stated that she could not 
bring herself to sell the home to satisfy the debt because of the emotional connection she felt to the 
home and neighborhood. Id. 
 249 Kahrl, supra note 27, at 906–07. 
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enable gross inequities, whether deliberate or as a side effect of gentrification, 
should not be allowed to persist in this state.250 
Finally, the implementation of programs that address similar issues on a 
smaller scale could ameliorate some of the disparate impacts of this policy.251 
In 2018, the Massachusetts Access to Justice Commission (the Commission) 
began one-year housing and consumer debt pilot programs to address similar 
issues as are raised by the privatization of delinquent property tax liens.252 In 
the housing pilot, organizations collaborated to create a Housing Stabilization 
Center in Lawrence that served residents by providing mediation services to 
tenants and landlords and directed parties to critical resources and funding.253 
The program also worked with community outreach organizations to improve 
education for landlords and tenants about the resources available, and the Cen-
ter took on some housing cases.254 The consumer debt pilot focused on “up-
stream” resources available to debtors to help educate and train people about 
their rights and legal issues before their case becomes a crisis.255 The attorneys 
involved created online tools and forms for debtors and the service organiza-
tions that operate to assist these individuals and helped secure representation 
for dozens of consumer debtors.256 The lessons from these programs should 
serve to inform the Commission, the Legislature, or service organizations on 
                                                                                                                           
 250 See id. at 905–06 (explaining the disproportionate impact that this policy has had on black and 
minority communities and detailing gross deliberate manipulations of the system that created unjust 
results). In Washington, D.C., prior to changing the policy, more than half of the tax lien foreclosures 
were in the District’s two poorest areas, Wards seven and eight. Sallah et al., supra note 1. The Wash-
ington Post reported that the most affected were elderly property owners who were sick or dying when 
the tax liens on their homes were purchased. Id. 
 251 See MASS. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N, supra note 229, at 6–8 (summarizing the Commis-
sion’s many efforts and programs during the previous year to improve access to counsel within the 
Commonwealth, including the housing pilot program and consumer debt pilot program that address 
issues similar to the issues presented by tax lien foreclosure cases). 
 252 See id. at 7–8 (describing the pilot programs, and the issues they aimed to tackle, which in-
cluded improving housing stability by making emergency funding available, improving education and 
understanding of legal problems, access to representation in the housing program, education on the 
rights that the defendant has, making tools available online to assist a self-represented litigant, and 
access to legal advice in the debt program). 
 253 Id. at 7. 
 254 Id. 
 255 See MASS. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N, CONSUMER DEBT PILOT SUMMARY REPORT 1 
(2019), http://www.massa2j.org/a2j/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Consumer-Debt-Pilot-Summary-
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQ4L-249K] (stating that one of the major goals of the program was to 
help consumer debtors address and solve their own issues before coming to the court, by improving 
resources such as online tools or non-legal service providers). 
 256 See id. at 1–2 (describing the online resources and forms created for the debtor or service 
organizations to use prior to beginning a case in court or the next hearing, the relationships facilitated 
with service providers to experiment with different methodologies to determine best practices, and 
attorney involvement through limited representation programs or individual representation). The pro-
gram’s pilot completed sixty cases and helped consumer clients save over $68,000 worth of debt. Id. 
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how to create programs and tools to lessen the effects of the policy as it cur-
rently exists.257 
      CONCLUSION 
Massachusetts’ policy of the privatization of delinquent property tax liens 
creates unjust outcomes for the most vulnerable members of society. The poli-
cy that was originally created to benefit cities is instead being utilized to ex-
ploit the poor, sick, and elderly. The policy’s negative impact on society often 
goes unnoticed or ignored, but far outweighs any marginal benefit that the mu-
nicipalities can claim to support the policy. Homeownership and home stability 
are a fundamental part of a person’s life, and this policy is unjust, unfair, and 
unconscionable. Although it is important for everyone to pay their share of 
property taxes, this draconian policy is not the proper solution and the Massa-
chusetts legislature should act to implement change. 
CAROLINE ENRIGHT 
 
                                                                                                                           
 257 See, e.g., id. at 1–3 (detailing the improvements that the program was able to produce, ad-
dressing issues prevalent in tax lien foreclosure cases like access to representation, education, and 
self-help resources). 
  
 
